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Glossary
ADB - Asian Development Bank
ANIEs -  Asian newly industrialised economies
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan)
APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ALER  - Asymptotic Liability-Export Ratio
BIS -  Bank of International Settlements
bn - billion (defined as 1000 million)
BOT - Bank of Thailand
DGDP - external debt-to-GDP ratio
DX - external debt-to-export ratio
ENPV - expected net present value
ERM -  (European) Exchange Rate Mechanism
FDI - foreign direct investment
Forex - foreign exchange
IMF -  International Monetary Fund
LAEs -  Latin American economies
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico)
MIT economies - Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand
mn - million
OECD - Organisation of Economic Cooperation  
and Development
REER - real effective exchange rates
SEAEs  - Southeast Asian economiesiv
(Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand)
TFP - total factor productivity
WFO - World Financial Organisation
WTO - World Trade Organisation
Unless otherwise stated, all dollar currency denominations refer to US dollars.v
THE CURRENCY AND FINANCIAL CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
A CASE OF ‘SUDDEN DEATH’ OR ‘DEATH FORETOLD’?
ABSTRACT
Almost all existing studies on the causes, consequences and policy
implications of the economic and financial crisis faced by East Asia have provided
only a cursory discussion of broad data at best, or have fallen into the trap of merely
stating the weaknesses in the economies as a ‘matter of fact’ at worst. Ex-post facto
analysis is of little value. In this paper, limiting our focus to the Southeast Asian
economies (viz. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines), we carefully
scrutinise the available economic data in a systematic manner, with a view to
determining whether there were possible indications of discernible deterioration in
economic ‘fundamentals’ that might have been indicative of an impending crisis. In
other words, we aim to determine whether the crisis was a ‘death foretold’ (i.e. ‘an
accident waiting to happen’) as most observers seem to assume, or a quick and
‘sudden death’ as Sachs et al. (1996b) have suggested of the Mexican crisis of 1994-
95. We take pains to focus solely on the policies/factors that seemed to have a direct
impact on the crisis. To get a sense of proper prospective, we consider both trends in
the various indicators of the Southeast Asian economies from 1990 to 1996 (just prior
to the onset of the crisis in mid-1997), as well as compare their performance to the
Latin American economies of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. While such inter-regional
comparisons and generalisations are conceptually useful, intra-regional differences
are highlighted where deemed necessary. After the determination and clarification of
the analytical issues, we move on to discuss important lessons for economic policy.
Focus is both on policy lessons (at national, regional and international levels) for
recovery as well as for reform, so as to reduce the possibility of such a crisis surfacing
in the future (or at least to mitigate the adverse fallout if or when it does occur).1
What are the prospects for this region?..The growth process is not about to collapse:
this notion that, because this is an extensive growth process, it has to end abruptly is
just wrong...Countries have to be vigilant to ensure that they do not destroy the
process by allowing overheating or otherwise the macroeconomy to get out of hand.
But none of the East Asian countries has pursued an excessively easy
macroeconomic policy, none has tolerated even double-digit inflation, and most have
small government and small budget deficits. So the risk of prolonged slowdown
caused by a need for major macroeconomic adjustment is small.
Stanley Fischer (1996), First Deputy Managing Director, IMF
1. Introduction and Motivation
There has been an impressive growth in the literature on the causes,
consequences and policy implications of the economic and financial crisis faced by
East Asia. However almost all studies thus far have provided only a cursory
discussion of broad data at best, or they fall into the trap of merely stating the
weaknesses in the economies as a ‘matter of fact’ at worst
1. Largely missing from this
ex-post facto analysis so far has been any careful scrutiny of the available economic
data in a systematic manner, with a view to determining whether there were possible
indications of discernible deterioration in economic ‘fundamentals’ that might, in turn,
have been indicative of an impending crisis.
This is a point of critical importance for two reasons. On the one hand, if
available data did provide substantive evidence of a deterioration in fundamentals,
then clearly, policy-makers, international and regional economic agencies and
informed observers are guilty of having ‘fallen asleep at the wheel’. The implications
for surveillance are then obvious, with the focus needing to be on effective
implementation and co-ordination to prevent a repeat of the oversight.
On the other hand, if the available data fails to reveal any significant
deterioration in economic fundamentals, then the problem becomes more complex. In
                                               
1 The recent study by Corsetti, et al. (1998) is a very admirable exception. In an otherwise
excellent paper, unfortunately, they too seem at times to succumb to the temptation of drawing
conclusions (or using only empirical studies) that are supportive of seemingly preconceived
(popular) notions of the problems, rather than an objective examination of the data and all
pertinent empirical studies.2
particular, there are two possibilities (that are by no means mutually exclusive) which
need to be considered.
One, the available data (which are largely macro) may be hopelessly
inadequate for purposes of analysing the economic health of a country. If so, there
has to be urgent focus on ensuring the availability of and access to more detailed,
transparent and timely data (such as, for instance, pre-tax rate of return on physical
investment, manner in which savings are channelled, etc.).
Two, following the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) in 1992-93 and the Mexican crisis (and accompanying Tequila effect) in 1994-
95, there has been much discussion in the international finance and development
literature about so-called ‘multiple equilibra’ which show how currency runs may be
‘self-fulfilling’. While implications of these are taken up later in the paper (section 5.1),
it suffices to note here that insofar as these models are applicable to the regional
crisis in East Asia, those who argue that the problems in the region were ‘obvious’
and a ‘death foretold’ (i.e. ‘an accident waiting to happen’), are way off the mark.
Rather, the regional economic collapse may be characterised more appropriately as
being one of a quick and ‘sudden death’, as has been argued by Sachs et al. (1996b)
to have been the case of the Mexican crisis. Insofar as this is true, the policy
implications become far more complex and must be of some concern.
Once these analytical issues have been determined and clarified, one can go
on to discuss other important lessons for economic policies, which we do in some
detail in this paper. Focus is both on policy lessons for recovery as well as on reform,
so as to reduce the possibility of such a crisis surfacing in the future (or at least to
mitigate the adverse fallout if/when it does occur).
Before proceeding, it must be emphasised that the popularly termed ‘East
Asian meltdown’ should appropriately be seen as two related but distinct crises. On
the one hand, there are the currency instabilities and financial market fragilities
plaguing the Southeast Asian economies (henceforth referred to as the SEAEs) of
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (so-termed ‘MIT’ economies) and less so, the3
Philippines. On the other are the acute structural problems faced by Korea, the only
other Asian OECD member apart from Japan. The Korean economy’s difficulties were
caused primarily by industrial policies based on highly diversified conglomerates (or
chaebols) (see appendix 1 for an elaboration of the distinction between Korea and the
SEAEs).
Admittedly, the SEAEs also confronted some similar concerns in terms of
weak banking systems with substandard disclosure procedures, structure of external
indebtedness (loaded at the short end) and weak conglomerates (primarily in
Indonesia). In turn, the problems in Korea were magnified and brought forward by
initial speculative attacks on some of the currencies of the SEAEs (mainly due to the
‘contagion effect’ elaborated upon in section 5.2, as well as exposures as consequent
losses incurred by the Korean banks which had lent to firms in the SEAEs). The focus
of this paper is principally on the currency and financial crises faced by the SEAEs,
though, where relevant, reference has been made to the impact of the crisis on Korea
in particular, but also to the other East Asian newly industrialising economies (ANIEs)
of Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the
background to the crisis, paying attention to weaknesses that may or may not be
evident in the broad macro data. It is important to emphasise that, contrary to popular
discussion, the SEAEs, while sharing some broadly similar characteristics, are by no
means a homogenous group. We highlight some important country-specific issues in
this section. Section 3 provides an overview of the crisis. A preliminary post-mortem
of the crisis, as it currently stands, is the focus of section 4. The penultimate section
provides a detailed discussion of a number of important lessons for economic policy
that may be derived from the crisis. The final section concludes. Three appendices
follow. The first of these provides an elaboration of the differences in the problems
experienced by the Korean economy and those faced by the SEAEs. The second
discusses a possible measure of external creditworthiness. The third provides an
illustration of the micro-mechanics of a currency attack.4
2. Background to the Crisis
This section provides a background to the Southeast Asia crisis, Undoubtedly,
there have been a whole host of policies/factors in place in the SEAEs that are non-
conducive to growth, and have been brought to the fore following the crisis. However
a number of them (such as trade restrictions, income inequality and type of political
regime) have little to do with the crisis per se. We take pains to focus solely on the
policies/factors that seemed to have a direct impact on the crisis. To get a sense of
proper prospective, we consider both trends in the various indicators of the SEAEs
from 1990 to 1996 (just prior to the onset of the crisis in mid-1997) , as well as
compare their performance to the Latin American Economies (LAEs) of Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico
2. While such inter-regional comparisons and generalisations are
conceptually useful, intra-regional differences are highlighted where deemed
necessary.
2.1 Current Account Deficits
Referring to chart 1, between 1990 and 1996, the immediate problem that
seemed to stand out for Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, was the fairly large
current account deficits that they each ran. The US deputy Treasury Secretary,
Lawrence Summers, has reportedly suggested that ‘close attention’ needs to be paid
to current account deficits over 5 percent of GDP (The Economist, December 23,
1995-January, 5, 1996, pp.46-8). The Philippines’ current account deficit was the
lowest among the three SEAEs, averaging 4.2 percent of GDP. The other two SEAEs
were relatively higher, averaging 6.0 percent in Malaysia and 7.5 percent in Thailand,
both above the crude 5 percent rule of thumb. Indonesia’s current account deficit was
2.6 percent of GDP, comparable to Mexico (2.4 percent) Argentina, while Brazil’s was
almost half that. More revealing are probably the trends in the current account deficits.
                                               
2 We excluded Chile which by and large was an outlier among the LAEs, being the most
economically stable. In some way, this is analogous to Singapore being the most
fundamentally sound economy in the Southeast Asian region, and is generally not considered
here.5
Among the LAEs, Mexico’s and to a lesser extent, Argentina’s current account deficits
have both fallen significantly since peaking in 1994 (this corresponding to the onset of
the Mexican financial crisis, with Argentina the most adversely impacted by the
Tequila effect). Brazil’s current account deficit has however been moving upward
since 1993 (and has therefore been of some concern to observers). Among the
SEAEs, the Philippines’ current account deficit has remained stable at about 4.5
percent of GDP since 1994. Four years of consecutive increases culminated with
Malaysia’s current account deficit reaching a high of 10 percent in 1995 (beating the
previous peak of 8.8 percent in 1992). However, it dropped dramatically by more than
half by 1996. On the other hand, in the case of Thailand and Indonesia, their
respective current account deficits rose significantly since 1993, jumping up between
1994 and 1995 and staying stable at that higher level in 1996.
Chart 1
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP), 1990-96
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     Note:  Positive value implies deficit, negative value implies surplus
  Source: See Table A16
On closer scrutiny though, the current account deficits in Malaysia and
Thailand in particular did not seem all that worrisome. This is so, as unlike most
developing economies, they were clearly not caused by either fiscal profligacy or low
private savings. Both economies had positive fiscal balances (chart 2) and aggregate
private savings rates of over 30 percent (chart 3). Indonesia’s savings rate too was
almost 30 percent. In comparison, the savings rates in the three LAEs as well as the
Philippines were each less than 20 percent, and all ran small fiscal deficits. Indeed, in
the run-up to the Mexican crisis in 1994, there is evidence that the high current
account deficit (over 7 percent in 1994) was primarily due to a fall in savings rates,
particularly public savings, as the fiscal stance was relaxed somewhat (chart 2, Burki
and Edwards, 1995 and Edwards, 1998).
Chart 2
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP), 1990-96
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Chart 3



















      Source: See Table A1
Given the national income accounting identity (which requires that, by
definition, domestic investment equals the excess of the trade balance over national
savings), the current account deficits in the Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand (henceforth
referred to as the ‘MIT’ economies) had to be due to very high rates of domestic
investment. This is especially so when one considers the fact that there was a sharp
rise in the current account deficits in Malaysia and Thailand in 1995 (and Indonesia
also to a lesser extent), this corresponding to a spike in their respective investment-to-
GDP ratios (chart 4).
2.2 Investment-to-GDP Ratios
    Between 1990 and 1996, the investment-to-GDP ratios in the Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia on average were 41, 38 and 28 percent respectively. While
the Philippines was a laggard with a ratio of 22 percent, this was still slightly higher
than the 19 percent average of the LAEs. Officials in Thailand and Malaysia as well as
most observers of the region viewed the external deficits as ‘benign’ or ‘solvent’, in the
sense of being able to generate sufficient external surpluses in the future to payoff
existing liabilities. In other words, according to received wisdom, a high investment
ratio acts as a signal/commitment towards higher future economic growth, and8
therefore the perceived ability of the debtor nation to service the external debt in the
future (i.e. intertemporal solvency was secure)
3.
Chart 4
Investment (% of GDP), 1990-96
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    Source: See Table A1
The Singapore experience was held up as a case in point. Specifically,
Singapore had a sustained current account deficit between 1965 and 1985, but as the
returns on its high investments started paying off, the virtuous cycle of growth and
private savings, accompanied by a large fiscal balance, exceeded the investment
share (which remained high but flattened out). This ensured a sustained and rising
                                               
3 Intertemporal solvency requires that the current stock of net foreign liabilities be fully
covered by the expected stream of future external surpluses net of interest obligations
on accumulated debt. This condition is so weak that it is almost never violated (and
therefore of little practical use). More ‘structure’ may be imposed by requiring
satisfaction of the transversality condition. This condition requires that in the steady
state, the private plus fiscal primary deficit (i.e. excluding interest payment) – which is
approximately the trade deficit - may be run indefinitely as long as the growth rate in
real GDP is greater than the real interest rate (see appendix 2).9
current account surplus of about 20 percent in recent years
4 (see footnote 10).
Empirical validation of the above thesis was provided by Ostry (1997), who concluded
that the current account deficit was generally not a manifestation of over-borrowing for
consumption, at least not in Thailand
5. In contrast, when Atish and Ostry (1995) used
a similar methodology for the LAEs, it was found that the bulk of domestic absorption
of foreign funds prior to the Mexican crisis was tilted towards ‘over-consumption’ (also
see Corbo and Hernandez, 1994 and Milesi-Feretti and Razin, 1996).
High investment growth contributed to a sustained real GDP growth in the MIT
economies between 1990 and 1996 of over 8 percent each (chart 5). Growth in the
Philippines averaged 3.0 percent, comparable to those of the LAEs. The supply-side
growth of Thailand and Malaysia ensured that inflation was kept in check, averaging
3.9 and 5.2 percent respectively, while the relatively higher consumption-orientation of
funds consequently led to relatively higher rates of inflation in Indonesia and the
Philippines, but far lower than those of the inflation-prone LAEs (table A1).
                                               
4 More specifically, Singapore’s trade account is still in deficit, but this is more than offset by a
huge surplus in trade in services, reflecting the economy’s comparative advantage in that
area.
5 The methodology utilised by Ostry (1997) is the concept of optimal consumption-smoothing
current account, i.e. current account imbalances in an intertemporally solvent economy reflect
divergences of national output and its components from their ‘permanent’ levels. It is based on
the assumption of utility maximisation subject to a lifetime resource constraint with open
capital markets (i.e. the Fisher separation theorem between investment and savings holds)
(see Milesi-Feretti and Razin, 1996 for a lucid discussion). Under these and other
simplifications, the important result derived is that current account deficits reflect expected
output growth in the future.10
Chart 5
GDP Growth Rates (%),1990-96
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2.3 Investment Allocations
Concern had been voiced that the deployment of capital recently by the
four SEAEs were in unproductive government-led or government-approved
projects with low potential for output and particularly export growth. Given the
dependence on external financing of investments, the specific focus on export
growth is important in order to generate sufficient foreign exchange (forex)
revenues to be able to service external debt with minimal disruption to
economic activity in case of an unanticipated cessation of capital inflows - due
to, for instance, an expectations-driven liquidity crisis. (see appendix 2). - The
expected rates of return from these investments were said to be considerably
less than the actual (or at least the opportunity) costs incurred, i.e. negative (or
at most abnormally low) expected net present values. Impressionistic evidence
cited included:11
a) Indonesia’s forays into the high-tech and capital intensive areas, such as the
national car (‘Timor’), and general funding of other projects that lacked economic
viability, but were pet projects of ‘well-placed’ individuals;
b) a number of grandiose infrastructural projects in Malaysia, including a major
(Bakun) dam, and the tallest buildings in the world in the eighty eight floor twin
Petronas Towers ; and
c) Thailand, with it’s half-completed major highways and other major urban
development activities documented in Rimmer (1995).
Over the period 1990-96, the public-private investment mix in Indonesia and
Malaysia were each about 1 to 2 (chart 6). In Indonesia, the private investment-to-
GDP ratio between 1990 and 1996 averaged 18.2 percent and the public investment-
to-GDP ratio was 9.6 percent. The corresponding figures were 25.1 and 12.8 percent
in Malaysia. While private investment as a share of GDP in Thailand averaged 33.1
percent, public investment-to-GDP ratio averaged only 8.0 percent.
Chart 6
Private and Public Investment Breakdown (% of GDP), Average 1990-96
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Chart 7 shows the annual international finance for private infrastructure
projects in the SEAEs, most of the expenditure being on telecommunications and
power generation (Kohli, et al., 1998).
Chart 7






















Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
          Source:  Kohli, et al. (1998)
International claims to the public sector were negligible compared to those at
the bank and non-bank private sectors in 1995 and 1996 (table 1). As such, insofar as
the data can be taken at face value, the suggestion that public sector ‘white
elephants’ were the primary cause of the current account deficit, seems inconsistent
with available macro data for at least Thailand in particular, but also Malaysia and
Indonesia. The Philippines’ aggregate investment and public-private mix was broadly
similar to the LAEs’ (with the private sector being about four times as large as the
public sector).13
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Note:  a) Rounding-off error
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998b)
Given that the bulk of the investments in the countries have been undertaken by the
private sector, in the absence of gross domestic price or other microeconomic
distortions, one would expect that the investments were, for the most part, optimally
channelled (i.e. potentially growth enhancing) (see however discussion in section
2.3.1). This is in fact the motivation behind the ‘Lawson doctrine’ (named after then
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson). According to this notion, a current
account deficit is not viewed as precarious so long as it is primarily due to the private
sector (or, in other words, as long as fiscal profligacy is not the reason for the current14
account deficit) (Corden, 1994, chapter 6)
6. Insofar as the Lawson doctrine is
accepted, the current account deficits run by the LAEs (Thailand particularly) ought
not to have been any cause for concern. Indeed, the high export and moderate total
factor productivity (TFP) growth enjoyed by some of these economies (chart 8) seems
to attest to this point (Ostry, 1997 and Sarel, 1995, 1997)
7,8.
                                               
6 By making a clear distinction between public and private spending, the Lawson doctrine
assumes that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold (Reisen, 1998).
7 This may be an appropriate point to note that, prior to the crisis, Young (1994, 1995), utilising
conventional empirical growth accounting studies, found the fast-growing East Asian
economies to have experienced low-to-nil total TFP growth over the last two to three decades.
Drawing primarily on this study, Paul Krugman (1994), in a very publicised and somewhat
controversial paper, suggested that their growth was bound to taper down in the not-too-
distant future. Four points are of significance. First, the sources of growth in East Asia -
Singapore in particular - remain open to debate, with Hsieh (1997), Sarel (1995, 1997) and
Nelson and Pack (1996), Felipe (1988), Felipe and Comb (1998), suggesting that the Young
studies are respectively empirically and conceptually flawed for various reasons. Second, by
his own admission, Krugman's critique pertains to growth performance in the medium and
longer-terms, not an abrupt halt. Third, no mention was made by Krugman-Young of potential
weaknesses in the banking and financial sector, their focus being on the `real side' (though
there are obviously some interconnections between the real and financial sectors). Fourth,
according to Krugman's critique, Singapore's economy was potentially most at risk of a growth
slow-down (complete halt?), he comparing it to the Stalinist-led growth in the former Soviet
Union (i.e. growth-without-efficiency). In fact, the Singapore economy has been the least
affected in Southeast Asia (both in terms of currency devaluation and projected short-term
projected growth). This notwithstanding, as noted, to the extent that Krugman's view was well-
publicised in the popular media, it may plausibly have added to the perception that the
(cyclical) slow-down in regional export growth in 1996-97 was structural in nature. This may
have in turn contributed to the re-evaluation of the sustainability of current account imbalances
in the Thailand and other regional economies (see appendix 2 for an elaboration of the
importance of creditor-perception to the willingness to continue to lend/rollover existing debts).
8 As is the case more often than not, broad generalisations of the SEAEs gloss over some
important country differences. In this light, the survey of some of the TFP literature on East
Asian economies since 1960 by Quek and Lee (1997) is useful. Broadly, their reading of the
various empirical studies suggest:
a) the Philippines has seen a declining trend in TFP growth performance (starting at an
initially high base);
b) Singapore’s TFP growth has enjoyed a spurt since the mid 1980s (after its last recession
in 1985-86);
c) no definite conclusion can be drawn with regard to the MIT economies, some studies
suggesting an improvement in TFP growth over time, others suggesting otherwise. The
important point here is that the growth literature per se would ex-ante (i.e. prior to he
crisis) not have provided sufficient (if any) evidence about gross resource mis-allocation.
This is particularly so, given the recent scathing criticisms of growth accounting studies as
a useful measure of aggregate technological relationships between output and inputs by
Felipe (1998) and Felipe and McCombie (1998) (though nothing should be taken away
from the contributions by Young and other careful empirical growth accounting studies).
This apart, changes in incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs) are also of limited use in
drawing conclusions about resource allocations, as they could merely reflect changing
comparative advantages of countries, rather than technological progressions/regression.15
Chart 8
Export Growth Rates (%) 1990-96
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    Source: See Table A1
2.3.1    Sources of Microeconomic Distortions and Other Weaknesses
While the macroeconomic data seems ‘benign’, three critical caveats however
bear keeping in mind. First, as noted by Kohli, et al. (1998), major infrastructural
projects in SEAEs were not based on competitive bidding. In fact many projects were
“procured through direct solicitation or in response to private sector proposals.” Thus
private monopolies were encouraged and operations lacked transparency. While this
preference for non-competitive bidding was justified in the terms of ‘saving time’ and
‘minimising transactions costs’, they also left open the possibility of - what has been
popularly termed - ‘crony capitalism’
9.
Second, despite being private sector projects, most major ones were given
implicit (and sometimes explicit) guarantees of all kinds, including exchange rate
stability, market share, rate of return, and the like. To the extent that this acted as an
                                               
9 This problem had become particularly pervasive in Indonesia, where former president
Suharto’s family invariably had a stake in almost every major project being undertaken in the
country (Komatsu, 1998).16
‘insurance’ to the investors, there was probably the typical moral hazard problem in
operation. Specifically, economic decision-making was in all likelihood distorted in the
direction of ‘over-investment’, with scant attention being paid to potential project
riskiness (and therefore risk management strategies).
Third, given these contingent liabilities of the governments, their fiscal
positions were not nearly as sound as the data would explicitly suggest. This is
particularly so once other off-budget items and contingent liabilities are included (see
Asher and Heij, 1998 in general and Komatsu, 1998 in the case of Indonesia).
Fourth, no matter how potentially productive the investments might be, insofar
as the benefits are accrued way in the future (given the time lags involved in major
infrastructural projects), dependence on external financing, particularly that which is
short-term in nature, could pose significant potential risks. This is so, as the countries
could find the external source of financing to be abruptly cut-off, with projects left
uncompleted and firms/governments indebted, unable to generate revenue streams to
pay off the liabilities incurred
10.
2.4 External Indebtedness
Kohli, et al. (1998) have documented how the bulk of financing of private
infrastructural projects has been through foreign rather than domestic sources, and
from syndicated loans, rather then through bond or equity financing (chart 9). This is
in sharp contrast to the LAEs, where a substantial share of the flows has come
through privatisation of state-owned assets. The dependence on external financing by
the SEAEs is especially peculiar, given the high private savings rates in these
economies (though Malaysia was moving towards greater domestic project financing).
Immature capital markets and risk aversion of domestic savers have been offered as
rationale.
                                               
10 This was the big difference between Singapore’s consistent current account deficit in the
1970s and early 1980s, i.e. global capital mobility during that period was much more limited
and financing largely took the form of longer-term flows, foreign direct investment (FDI) in
particular.17
Chart 9
Sources of Financing of Private Infrastructure Projects in East Asia (US$
Million), 1986-96
           Source: Kohli, et al. (1988)
The oft-cited World Bank bench-mark external debt-to-GDP (DGDP) and debt-
to-exports (DX) ratios are 0.8 and 2.2 respectively. More conservative/demanding
‘rules of thumb’ are 0.5 and 2.0 respectively (Cohen, 1997). As of 1996, the DGDP
ratio in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand stood at about 0.5. The figures for
Malaysia, Argentina and Brazil were relatively lower at 0.2-0.3, while Mexico’s ratio
saw a sharp increase in 1995 (to 0.7) and remained high at about 0.6 in 1996.
Malaysia’s DX ratio as at end 1996 was slightly less than 0.3 (chart 10). While
Thailand’s was relatively higher at about 1.9, it was still lower than even the more
conservative rule of thumb. and comparable to the Mexican ratio of 1.6. The ratios for
Indonesia and the Philippines were 2.2 and 2.1 respectively, acceptable based on the
World Bank bench-marks, and far lower than that of Argentina, which was 3.7.18
Chart 10
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Debt/GDP Debt/Exports
Note: Data unavailable for Brazil.
Source: See Table A1
Another potentially useful indicator is the forex reserves-to-short term debt
ratio (chart 11). Argentina and Malaysia have maintained relatively high ratios, and
those of the Philippines and Brazil were moderate in terms of being above 1 (1.7 and
1.5 respectively) as of 1996. Of concern might have been Indonesia, with a ratio of
0.7 and Thailand with a ratio of 0.9. However both these nations did not look as
unfavourable when compared to Mexico (0.5).
Chart 11
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2.5 Exchange Rate Policies
All the SEAEs pegged their exchange rates to particular trade-weighted basket
of currencies. While the weights are undisclosed, it is generally acknowledged that the
US$ had the highest weight. The significant appreciation of the Japanese yen vis-à-
vis the $ following the Plaza Accord in 1985, meant that all the SEAEs weakened
relative to the yen. Both the exchange rate level as well as its stability (table 2) acted
as catalysts for a wave of Japanese FDI to relocate operations to the region. This
export-oriented FDI in turn was the reason behind the surge in exports enjoyed by the
SEAEs, with the US being the major export market (Goldberg and Klein, 1997 and
Kawai, 1997). The high import content of most FDI from Japan and intermediate
capital imports needed for the infrastructural projects kept import growth volumes
high, and consequently the trade deficit in imbalance. The high import content
ensured that the real exchange rates (REERs) of the SEAEs  maintained a slightly
downward trends between 1993 to 1995, despite robust regional economic growth
(chart 12)
11.
                                               
11 To be sure, the REER is an index of the ratio of the price of nontradables and the domestic
price of tradables in the country. Assume the focus country is Thailand. Then Thailand’s REER
is usually proxied by [Thailand‘s price index] divided by [nominal effective exchange rate (e.g.
Thai baht per trade weighted basket of foreign currencies) multiplied by the ratio of a trade
weighted basket of foreign price indices]. This is so, as the domestic price index coincides with
the domestic price of nontradables, while the weighted average of foreign price indices
multiplied by the nominal effective exchange rate corresponds to the price of tradables. Note
that a REER appreciation per se is not undesirable if it is a reflection of a secular trend in the
‘equilibrium’ level. This may be due to, for instance, differing rates of technological change
between the tradables and nontradables sector (the so-called ‘Balassa-Samuleson’ theorem)
or differing growth rates and income elasticities of exports and imports (Neuhas, et al., 1998
and Krugman, 1990). The problem occurs when the cause of the appreciation is only transitory
and sudden, and will reverse itself in the future.20
Table 2
Annual (%) Changes in Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rates (Relative to US$),
1990-1996
a
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   -0.4
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Notes:      a) Local currency per $ (period average). Positive sign implies depreciation of  local
                 currency and  vice versa
   b) standard deviation
Sources: Computed by author from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Notes: a)Measured against a broad currency basket of 22 OECD currencies and
23 developing economy currencies. Weights are derived from 1990
bilateral trade patterns of the corresponding countries. A rise implies a
fall in competitiveness (appreciation) and vice versa
b) Approximations
Sources: Compiled by author from World Bank, Global Development Finance 1998 and
World Debt Tables (various years)
2.6 Foreign Capital Flows and Intermediation
Between 1989 and 1995, net capital inflows in Thailand and Malaysia were
10.2 and 8.8 percent of their respective GDPs (table 3 and chart 22). The figures for
Indonesia and the Philippines were more modest at 4.2 and 2.7. According to World21
Bank (1996) data, between 1990 and 1995, on a cumulative basis, the MIT
economies and Mexico were among the top twelve countries in terms of net private
capital inflows. The three SEAEs, together with China and Korea accounted for about
half of the nearly $4.9bn loan syndications by commercial banks in 1994-95.
Consequently, there was a rapid rise in credit to the private sector in all the SEAEs
during that period (table 4).
Table 3






1991  1992  1993 1994  1995
Indonesia:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




   4.2
   1.3
   0.4
   2.6








   2.5
   1.2
   0.0
   1.4
   1.1
  -3.0
   3.1
   1.2
   1.1
   0.7
   0.9
  -1.3
    3.9
    1.4
    0.6
    1.9
    0.1
    0.4
   6.2
   2.3
   0.7




Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




   8.8
   6.5
   0.0
   2.3









   8.9
   0.0




   7.8
   0.0
   9.7
  -0.6
-17.7
    1.5
    5.7
    0.0
  -4.2
    0.2
    4.3
   8.8
   4.8
   0.0
   4.1
  -0.1
   2.0
Philippines:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




   2.7
   1.6
   0.2
   0.9








   2.0
   1.3
   0.1
   0.6
   1.9
  -1.5
   2.6
   1.6
  -0.1
   1.1
   2.3
  -1.1
    5.0
    2.0
    0.4
    2.5
    0.8
   -1.9
    4.6
    1.8
    0.3
    2.4
    1.4
   -0.9
Thailand:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment





   1.5
   1.3
   7.4








   8.7
   1.4
   0.5
   6.8
   0.1
  -2.8
   8.4
   1.1
   3.2
   4.1
   0.2
  -3.2
    8.6
    0.7
    0.9
    7.0
    0.1
   -3.0
  12.7
    0.7
    1.9
  10.0
    0.7
  -4.4
Notes:   a) Data for 1996-97 in table 7
 b) - denotes a rise and vice versa
 c) Annual average
Source:  IMF (1997b)22
Table 4
Money and Credit, 1992-96
(%)
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  78.9
  29.2














































































    3.8
 142.0
   26.0
   80.8
   17.0





    3.9
Notes:      a) PSC - private sector claims
    b) Growth refers to annual average
Sources: Compiled by author from Corsetti, et al. (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998a)
Low interest rates in Japan in the past few years (given the sluggish domestic
economy), encouraged what has been referred to as ‘carry trade’, i.e. borrowing in
Japan at low interest rates and lending to the SEAEs, which offered higher rates (see
footnotes 13 and 14). Chart 14 reveals that Japanese banks have been involved in
the majority of lending to the region, accounting for over 30 percent of external
lending to the MIT economies. Consistently robust growth over the two decades,
relative invulnerability to the Tequila crisis, and a general sense of self-congratulation
and triumphalism in the region (both by the policy-makers and a spate of books23
extolling the coming ‘East Asian/Asia Pacific Century’) - by raising the expected ex-
ante returns - were further causes for the boom of capital inflows.
Chart 13
Nationality of Banks Providing Loans to the Southeast Asian Economies and





















































Note: Europe refers to France, Germany and United Kingdom
Source: Calculated by author from Goldstein and Hawkins (1998a)
The appreciation of the $ relative to the Japanese yen and with it, the regional
currencies as well, further galvanised this inflow. Of the credit intermediated through
the banking system, it is reported that about 30 percent of outstanding bank loans in
the Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were channelled into the property market (JP
Morgan, 1998, p.5). This in turn led to asset price inflation in 1992 and 1993 and
again in 1996, for all economies save Thailand (chart 14).24
Chart 14
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   Source: Corsetti, et al. (1998)
A high and growing M2-to-foreign reserves ratio - which captures the extent to
which liabilities of the banking system are backed by international reserves - is among
the leading indicators of a currency crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). This ratio
increased sharply in the case of all the SEAEs except Thailand (chart 15).
Chart 15
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Source:  See Table 425
A closer examination of the breakdown of capital flows to the individual SEAEs
would have revealed some potential sources of concern for Thailand in particular.
2.7 Thailand
  Portfolio investment (as a share of GDP) was negligible in all the SEAEs,
except Thailand, in which the ratio was 1.3 percent between 1989 and 1995.
Thailand’s net direct investment flow-to-GDP ratio was also a paltry 1.5 percent. This
had to mean that the much of the investments were financed through borrowing (7.4
percent of GDP) (table 3). Of even greater concern was the fact that short-term
borrowing predominated (tables 1 and A1). This reliance on short-term debt to finance
investments, and the resultant maturity mismatch with longer-term investment
projects, has been a major issue of concern in Thailand, and was due to a variety of
factors
12.
The $ was said to have constituted 80 to 90 percent of the currency basket
system used in determining the level of the baht (IMF, 1997a and Yanagihara and
Sambommatsu, 1996, pp.25). Hence the bilateral baht/$ nominal exchange rate had
been extremely stable since 1989 (table 2). The stability of this bilateral exchange rate
as well as the interest rate premium offered by Thailand - 400  basis points above
comparable US rates - provided the impetus for Thai firms to borrow overseas without
much concern for corporate risk management issues. In particular, most of the
external borrowing was left fully exposed to forex fluctuations (i.e. unhedged), given
the expectation of the maintenance of the peg of the baht to the $.
Unlike the other SEAEs (and like Korea), a large portion of the debt obligations
was incurred by the banking sector (table 1). This borrowing in turn was fuelled by a
rather hasty attempt by the Thai authorities at liberalising the financial sector and
                                               
12 A part of the short-term borrowing in the Thai data was actually FDI and intra-banking
transfers (Ostry, 1997, p.19). This is also readily apparent from source country data reports of
FDI undertaken in Thailand. Further, Thailand’s robust export growth was undoubtedly due in
large part to these export-oriented FDI. The issue of lack of transparency of data in the SEAEs
is critically important and discussed further in section 5.11.26
relaxation of capital controls without corresponding improvements in supervisory
arrangements. The preceding was epitomised by the establishment of the Bangkok
International Banking Facility (BIBF) in early 1993. Banks under the BIBF were
authorised to accept deposits and loans from abroad in foreign currency and extend
loans to both overseas and local markets, as well as engage in cross-currency forex
change trading and loan syndication (Asian Monetary Monitor, July-August, 1994,
pp.24-6 and Chaiyasoot, 1995, p.172). On their part, Japanese financial institutions in
particular were obviously keen on lending at the higher interest rates offered in
Thailand
13.
The observed interest rate spread in Thailand in particular (as well as the
other SEAEs generally) were sustained due to sterilisation of capital inflows
14. This
led to a doubling of forex reserves between early 1992 to early 1996, while keeping
broad money growth (M2) relatively moderate in comparison to the other SEAEs. This
explains the relatively low M2-to-international reserves ratio in Thailand despite higher
capital inflows (chart 15) as well as the moderate forex reserves-to-short term debt
ratio (chart 11), despite the higher short-term external debt liabilities. Unlike the other
SEAEs, Thailand’s external debt-to-export ratio in particular, but also the external
debt-to-GDP ratio were not on declining trends (table A1 and chart 10). External debt
                                               
13 The reasons for the relatively high (and sustained) interest rate premium offered in an
economy that has undertaken financial deregulation (even after accounting for potential default
and devaluation risk premia), remains a relatively under-researched area. Fischer (1993)
suggests a number of microeconomic imperfections, such as oligopolistic structures of the
finance industries and excessive interlocking ownership between finance, industrial and
commercial firms as rationale. The premium is sustained due to sterilisation of capital inflows
undertaken by the monetary authorities (see next footnote).
14 Sterilisation of  inflows of funds is aimed at precluding nominal appreciation by keeping the
domestic money supply in check. However, even abstracting from the fact that the
effectiveness of sterilisation per se is based on the assumptions of imperfect substitutability
between domestic and foreign bonds (so-called ‘portfolio balance channel’) and Ricardian
Equivalence not holding - these assumptions largely being valid in the case of developing
countries - it is still only a short-term/temporary option. This is so for two main reasons. First,
sterilisation leads to a hike in domestic interest rates, which in turn perpetuates portfolio capital
inflows into the country. Second, the monetary authority will be faced with mounting losses
(quasi fiscal costs), as it is in essence accumulating forex reserves which provide a lower
return than that on the domestic debt issued. Conversely, allowing for a nominal exchange
rate appreciation helps to control inflationary pressures. See Calvo, et al. (1995) and Schadler,
et al. (1993) for general issues and Glick and Moreno (1994) for a discussion on capital flows
and monetary policy in the specific context of East Asia.27
repayments due in 1997 were 90 percent of 1996 exports (Goldstein and Hawkins,
1998, p.24). Financial sector weaknesses came to fore with the spectacular collapse
of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce in May 1996 under the weight of 160bn baht in
outstanding loans.
All in all, the data does seem to have been suggestive of some ‘warning
signals’ for the Thai economy in terms of:
a) high dependence on short-term external borrowing;
b) the current account deficit, which had grown sharply to 8.1 percent of GDP in
1995 remained high at 8.0 percent in 1996 due to negative export growth in that
year (to be discussed in section 3);
c) rapid credit growth;
d) third consecutive year of outright decline in the overall stock market and property
price indices; and
e) rigid nominal exchange rates.
However some seeming important differences with the Mexican situation of 1994 also
existed in terms of the fiscal position not having been loosened, and the aggregate
savings rate remaining high. This contrasts with the consumption boom in Mexico
prior to its crisis
15. While down from the annual average of 8.9 percent between 1990
and 1995, Thailand’s GDP growth in 1996 remained at a fairly robust 6.9 percent. In
contrast, Mexico saw fairly sluggish growth of 3.4 percent between 1992 and 1994
(chart 5).
                                               
15 However a closer examination of Thailand’s savings rate since 1989, has led Asher and Rao
(1998, p.3) to the following conclusion, “(t)he saving behaviour in Thailand during this period is
characterised by virtual collapse of household saving, counter balanced by increases in the
importance of the other components, particularly depreciation and public saving.” Similarly,
Sirivedhin (1998, p.210) has argued that the average propensity to save by households has
been declining, counterbalanced by rising corporate savings, which has kept up private and
national savings. Conversely, in what seems to be a minority view, Sachs, et al. (1996a) have
suggested that the current account deficit in Mexico was due to high private investment, rather
than ‘over consumption’ or irresponsible fiscal behaviour. The issue of savings and use of
foreign funds is a key issue and requires much greater analysis (though data limitations
severely preclude as through an analysis as one would like).28
2.8 Malaysia
Malaysia’s macroeconomic picture differed somewhat from Thailand. Direct
investment-to-GDP ratio averaged 6.5 percent, while short and long-term debt were
almost equally divided (tables 1 and A1). This was in line with the Malaysian central
bank’s policy of using moral suasion to discourage companies from borrowing
offshore funds for domestic purposes. Malaysia also introduced a two-tier regulatory
system in 1994 to keep weak or undercapitalised banks under tabs, while allowing the
stronger ones to intermediate the credit inflows. Malaysia’s current account deficit fell
to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1996, after peaking at 10.0 percent in 1995 (chart 1)
16. And,
while Malaysia’s internal indebtedness was comparable to those of Thailand and
Indonesia, its external indebtedness was low (Leung, 1998)
17. In fact, indicators of
aggregate external indebtedness showed a steady declining trend (table A1). Of
major concern must have been the forex reserves-to-short term debt ratio. This ratio,
while remaining relatively high in 1996, did show a rather drastic downward trend
since 1990 (table A1). To put this in perspective though, the ratio remained the
highest among all the SEAEs, as well as in comparison to Brazil and Mexico.
While inflation rose slightly in 1995, it fell back to less than 4 percent in 1996
(tables A1 and A2) following the tightening of monetary growth (Reynolds, et al.,
1998, pp.13-5). The general consensus (based on analysts’ reports and comments)
was that the country seemed well-poised for continued robust growth, having taken
necessary and firm steps to counter possible macroeconomic weaknesses
(overheating) experienced in 1995. In other words, an objective reading of the data
suggests that if at all the Malaysian ringgit was to be attacked, solely on the basis of
                                               
16 The increase was mainly due to a sharp (30 percent) rise in intermediate imports by the
national airlines and shipping corporations as part of major expansion plans (Reynolds, et al.,
1998, p.19).
17 This is not unlike the cases of Brazil and Mexico in 1994-95, with the former depending
largely on domestic debt, in contrast to the heavy dependence on short-term external debt by
the latter (Calvo and Goldstein, 1996).29
fundamentals, 1995 would be the time when it was most vulnerable
18. The overall
macroeconomic picture improved significantly in 1996. Some ‘market validation’ of the
confidence in the Malaysian economy is provided by the overall and property stock
market price indices, which rebounded sharply in 1996, after averaging double-digit
negative growth the previous two years (chart 14)
19.
2.9 Indonesia
Indonesia’s external debt volume, as well as the manner in which the funds
were used - in terms of state directed lending and some amount of ‘over-consumption’
(Ostry, 1997) - provided some cause for concern. While the aggregate external debt
volume has been creeping upwards the last decade, of particular concern was the
growth in private sector debt liabilities. While public sector external debt liabilities
actually fell by slightly less than $10bn in 1997 compared to 1996,  those of the
private sector doubled to reach about $40bn in 1997 (Nomura, 1998a, p.32). Of
particular concern was the sharp rise in its current account deficit, which almost
doubled from 1.7 percent of GDP in 1994 to 3.3 percent in 1995-96 (chart 1). Its forex
exchange reserves-to-short term debt ratio remained low, but stable at 0.6-0.7 since
1990, and the lowest among the SEAEs (chart 12). Also, Indonesia’s M2-to-foreign
reserves was the highest of the SEAEs (chart 15). As documented by Montgomery
(1996), Indonesia’s financial system seemed to suffer many of the excesses and
problems present in Thailand, but this did not always show up in the macro data (also
                                               
18 As will be discussed in the next section, like Thailand, Malaysia experienced a sharp
slowdown in export growth. However, unlike Thailand, its external balance improved
significantly, while growth remained robust - i.e. there was no ‘crash landing’ of the economy,
as is typical of many countries that often characterise sharp reductions in external imbalances.
19  Note that this was unlike Thailand, in which the declines in 1994 continued and in fact
worsened in 1996 (chart 14).30
see Corsetti, et al., 1998, Ostry, 1997 and The Economist, July 26, 1997, pp.14-16)
20.
However a notable difference with Thailand was the rebound in equity prices in 1996
(chart 14).
2.10 The Philippines
It suffices to note that the Philippines was little different from the LAEs -
Argentina and Brazil in particular, and was a relative laggard among the SEAEs in
terms of macroeconomic performance. In fact, the Philippines was the only one of the
ASEAN countries to be adversely impacted in a significant way by the Tequila crisis
(Calvo and Reinhart, 1996 and Kharas, 1997). The Philippines was therefore as much
or as little vulnerable to a currency run as were the LAEs (abstracting from the
possibility of regional contagian effects to be discussed in section 5.2).
2.11 Summary of Fundamentals
Table 5 provides a succinct summary of the various indicators of some
important ‘economic fundamentals’ of the SEAEs along with Korea, Hong Kong and
Singapore compiled by Goldstein and Hawkins (1998b). Certain patterns seem to be
readily apparent. As noted, Thailand is the weakest when measures of external
imbalances and financial sector vulnerabilities are used. Korea, Indonesia and
Thailand had the highest short-term external debt-to-reserves. (As noted, Thailand
had particularly high reserves due to capital inflows, which kept the ratio relatively
lower). - Indonesia had the most vulnerable financial sector. A simple average of all
the indicators shows Thailand and Indonesia to have been the two weakest
economies in the region, with Singapore and Hong Kong being the strongest and
                                               
20 A number of stories abound about the gross mis-use of foreign funds in Indonesia. For
instance, the bankrupt Hong Kong-based Peregrine Investment Holdings had reportedly lent
$350mn to an Indonesian taxi company (named ‘Steady Safe’!) to finance the expansion the
taxi fleet. Reportedly, about $145mn of the funds was siphoned off by Indonesia’s ex-president
Suharto’s eldest daughter for the purchase of a toll road business. As the International
Currency Review  (April 1998, p.5)  noted, “(i)n other words, $145 million of the funds lent by
Peregrine ostensibly on behalf of its investor has vanished into the Suharto family’s
voluminous bank account.”31
Malaysia somewhere ‘in between’. (Taiwan was not included, but it would probably
have been the strongest of all).
Table 5































































































































Notes: a)  I - Indonesia, H - Hong Kong, K - Korea, M - Malaysia, P - Philippines,
S - Singapore, T - Thailand.
Ordinal ranking in descending order of ‘bad’ fundamentals
b)  In SDRs, June 1997
c)  1996
d)  1997
e)  change (%) in 1996 less the average change (%) previous three years
f)   June 1997
g)  unclear from source, but probably average of 1996 and 1997
h)  1997 estimates
i)   May 1996
j)   growth of credit to private sector relative to nominal GDP, 1996
k)  June 1997
I)   June 1997
m) equal weights to all fundamentals (including two others included in original sources)
n)  greater weights given to fundamentals in which Thailand is weakest
Source: Goldstein and Hawkins (1998b)32
3. Overview of the Crisis
21
Cyclical slow-down in regional export growth due largely to a shrinking in
global demand for semiconductors in 1996 (chart 16 and the Asian Monetary Monitor,
September-October, 1996) and a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade (mainly due
to falling prices of computer chips and electronic components), adversely affected the
ANIEs such as Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, along with the next-tier ANIEs of
Thailand and Malaysia. Thailand was particularly affected, with exports actually
declining by 1.3 percent in 1996 (chart 8 and tables A1 and A2).
Chart 16
Global Semiconductor Billings (Annual % Change), 1991-1997
Source: Bhaskaran (1998)
The nearly 50 percent nominal appreciation of the $ relative to the yen
between June 1995 to April 1997 (from 85 yen per $ to 125 yen per $), led to a rise in
                                               
21 The descriptive aspects of this section draws from ADB (1997, 1998), Corsetti, et al. (1998),
IMF (1997a,b,c), World Bank (1998), speeches and press-briefings of top-ranking IMF officials
and other materials posted on the IMF Internet homepage (www.imf.org). Articles from  Asia
Week (particularly the July 17, 1998 issue), Business Times (Singapore), The Economist, The
Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) various Country Reports, Euromoney (December 1997
issue), Far Eastern Economic Review, Financial Times, International Currency Review
(September, 1997 issue), New York Times and other periodicals as well as informal
discussions with market observers in the region were also highly beneficial. The listing of
materials on the crisis by Nouriel Roubini on his home page
(www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html) was invaluable in reducing search
costs.
%33
the value of the regional currencies relative to the yen and a concomitant loss in
competitiveness. This is indicated by the marked appreciations in the REER by end
December 1996, through into mid 1997 over 1995 (chart 12)
22. As previously noted,
while a REER appreciation does not necessarily denote a misalignment
(overvaluation), the sudden rise in the last two years (which was a complete reversal
of the downward trend the years before), rather than a gradual longer-term upward
trend, is indicative of a bona fide overvaluation and loss of competitiveness, as
opposed to due to productivity differentials, demand shifts and the like.
The perception of a structural – as opposed to pure cyclical - nature of this
regional export growth slow-down was fuelled by:
a) the popular assumption that there was a shift in regional comparative advantage
in labour-intensive goods to China (this was of particular concern to Indonesia and
the Philippines);
b) realisation of growing shortage of adequate skilled labour in Malaysia and
Thailand, both of which aimed at moving into the higher value-added end of the
production chain;
c) the threat of overproduction in certain major industries like autos and
semiconductors (ADB, 1997, pp.15-8)
23.
As appendix 2 outlines, given the dependence on short-term external debt,
even the perception of a slow-down in export growth could make the current account
deficits suddenly seem unsustainable and the economies no longer creditworthy. As
                                               
22 According to Wade and Veneroso (1998), the appreciation of the $ in 1995 was the result of
an agreement between the US Treasury and the Japanese Finance Ministry aimed at boosting
Japan’s export growth. By using the resulting trade surpluses to purchase US Treasury bills,
this was assumed to keep US interest rates low, thus contributing to growth in both Japan and
the US (the latter about to go through an election at that period).
23 It has become legion to argue that the initial sharp devaluation of the Chinese yuan against
the $ in 1994 and the granting of a tax rebate for exports significantly enhanced the cost
competitiveness of the country’s exports, and consequently contributed to a slow-down in
export and output growth in the most East Asian economies. This conclusion is however far
from certain, as until then, two exchange rates were in operation in China and the bulk (almost
80 percent) of the transactions were already being conducted at the unofficial lower rate. The
devaluation’s main aim was to bring the official rate in line with the unofficial one (IMF, 1997b,
Fernald, et al., 1998 and Liu, et al., 1998 and Zhang, et al., 1998).34
such, the shift in lender’s expectations could be self-confirming, resulting in a liquidity
crisis with potentially large costs to the economy. To be precise, a policy stance is
said to be sustainable if the ‘turning point’ from a trade deficit to trade surplus occurs
‘smoothly’, i.e. without extreme and sudden declines in consumption and economic
activity (Milesi-Feretti and Razin, 1996, p.8).
The IMF did reportedly caution in 1995 and 1996 Thailand about its high
current account deficit, shorter-term external debt build-up and the over-exposure of
finance companies in the property market (as indicated by statements by IMF officials
in various speeches and statements that may be found on the IMF homepage on the
web). However, given that even the IMF’s initial (i.e. pre-crisis) growth and other
macroeconomic projections suggested relative buoyancy in the Thai and other SEAEs
(IMF, 1997a), little heed was taken of the warnings, either by government officials or
the private sector. Thus, initial private sector and official forecasts for 1997 and
beyond were largely extrapolations from past trends. Indeed, Asian mutual funds were
said to have remained overweighted in Thailand until May-June, 1997 (Institutional
Investor, December 1997, pp.54-5). Private credit agencies too maintained constant
credit ratings for the countries (with the Philippines actually upgraded) (table 6 and
The Economist, December 13, 1997, pp.68-71). Risk premia on the syndicated loan
and bank spreads (over the Treasury securities) in all emerging markets including the
SEAEs had fallen (Cline and Barnes, 1997).35
Table 6
Credit Ratings of the Southeast Asian Economies and Korea, 1996-97
Country Standard & Poor’s
June 1996   June 1997   Dec.
1997
Moody’s







BBB               BBB             BBB-
 A+                 A+                A+
BB                 BB+              BB+
 A                   A                  BBB
AA-               AA-                B+
Baa3                 Baa3            B2
A1                     A1               A2
Ba2                   Ba1             Ba1
A2                     A2               Ba1
A1                     A1               Ba1
Notes: Rating System ranked from highest to lowest as follows:
Standard & Poor’s: Investment grade - AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+ A,, BBB+, BBB, BBB-
   Noninvestment grade - BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-
Moody’s:     Investment grade  - Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, 
   Baa3;      
      Noninvestment grade - Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B
Source:   World Bank (1998)
Political uncertainties in Thailand following the general elections in 1996; a
third consecutive year of asset price deflation in the country; REER appreciation of
the baht (which was the most dramatic among the SEAEs); and Thailand’s general
inaction with regard to the IMF’s warnings about the size and maturity structure of its
external debt and deteriorating current account deficit positions in the face of
diminished short-term export growth projections in 1997 (against the decline in 1996),
were all causes for concern by foreign investors and lenders. In addition, financial
scandals and reported bankruptcies of financial institutions - which were almost
always bailed out by the authorities - became an ever more frequent affair (Corsetti, et
al., 1998).
The extreme rigidity with which the baht was pegged to the US$, against the
backdrop of increasingly apparent financial sector weaknesses and macroeconomic
imbalances, made it a tempting target for speculators. This led to a series of attacks
on the currency in late 1996 and early 1997. The BOT was able to fend-off these
attacks mainly through the first-line of defence noted in appendix 3, i.e. entering into a
forward contract to act as the counterparty to the short-sellers of the baht. Interest36
rates were also raised slightly to drain liquidity (chart 17). These in turn led to even
sharper slides in equity prices (chart 18), which consequently exposed gross malaises
in the financial sector, as many finance companies had undertaken aggressive
property-based lending. In fact, by 1997, almost one-fifth of all lending by Thai finance
companies was reportedly classified as nonperforming by the Central Bank (chart 19),
with about half of the finance and securities companies suspected to be facing serious
financial difficulties (Souza, 1998).
Chart 17
Short-term Interest Rates (%)
A:  90-day Nominal Interest Rates (%), June1997-April 1998
B:  Real Interest Rates (%), 1996-1998
Source: Goldstein and Hawkins (1998)
Chart 1837
Equity Prices, June 1996-June 1998
Source:  IMF (1998c)
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Sources: Compiled by author from Radelet and Sachs (1998b) and The Economist
  November 13, 1997, p.19)
The problems in Thailand initially seemed largely contained, though equity
prices in the region (including Korea) had started to take a dive. A fresh round of
attacks on the baht was triggered on May 7, 1997. While the rationale for this is
unclear, the popular argument is that the anticipated rise in Japanese interest rates
triggered fears that the capital inflow due to carry trade would be diminished. A co-
ordinated intervention by Asian central banks in the forex markets, as well as a
general rise in interest rates (chart 17) in a number of the regional economies were38
undertaken to thwart the attack on the baht and, more importantly, to minimise the
possibility of contagion in the rest of the region. Selective capital controls and a steep
hike in the off-shore short-term interest rate to an annualised rate of 1300 percent (0.7
percent daily) were employed by the BOT. However, as the open position of the BOT
in the forward forex market in November-December 1996 came due in July 1997,
pressures on the baht continued unabated. As the magnitude of this open position
(estimated at $23.4 mn) became clear, it caught most people unawares, possibly
intensifying the speculative attacks. Finally, the Thai authorities acquiesced to the
pressure in July 2, allowing the currency to float. This led to an immediate almost 20
percent depreciation against the $
24.
The successful assault of the baht motivated attacks on other currencies in the
region which – at least according to the perceptions/outlook of market participants -
had similar macroeconomic problems. Thus, the Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit
and the Indonesian rupiah all came under pressure simultaneously. Despite attempts
at defending the currency, the peso was allowed to float on July 11, with the same
happening to the rupiah on August 14. The latter was after the Indonesian authorities
had reportedly spent $1.5bn in supporting the rupiah and jacked up interest rates
three-fold. The Malaysian ringgit also depreciated sharply by about 20 percent
between July to August, as Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohamed publicly
chastised `rogue speculators' (George Soros in particular) for the region's currency
problems (chart 20). On August 3rd, the Bank of Malaysia imposed a $2mn limit on
outstanding non-commercial-related ringgit transactions and the prime minister
threatened imposition of other controls on international currency transactions for all
purposes save international trade.
Sustained bearishness of the regional currencies was due to a number of
factors working in unison. These included:
                                               
24 The Thai finance minister announced publicly a couple of days prior to the devaluation that
such a move was "out of the question". (International Currency Review, April, 1988, p.4). Such
statements are more often than not a prelude to future devaluations!39
a) the high interest rates in the region (see appendix 3 for an exploration of the
various channels through which this could negatively impact the real economy);
b) weaknesses in the equity markets, which led to a withdrawal of foreign funds;
c) the rush by domestic firms to cover their open forex positions;
d) political uncertainty in Thailand (regarding the timing of the next general
elections), Malaysia (with the prime minister’s continued vociferous attacks on
Soros and other ‘greedy speculators’, and on-going rumours about a possible rift
between him and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim), Indonesia (with a presidential
election looming in 1998 and uncertainty at that time about whether president
Suharto would retire and who his successor/running-mate would be), and the
Philippines (also with upcoming national elections);
e) general doubt about whether appropriate financial and other structural reforms
would be undertaken by the countries involved (Indonesia in particular); and
f) grossly insufficient information made available to private agents to make
decisions, with the result that rumours - some unfounded or exaggerated - led to
continued uncertainties.
Even the strongest economies in the region were not spared. In August 1997,
both the Singapore and Taiwanese dollars came under duress, despite the fact that
both these economies had healthy current account surpluses. (Singapore, with
aggregate reserves of about $75bn and a population of only 3mn, has the world’s
highest  per capita reserve holdings to back its currency; and Taiwan, which is
similarly capital-rich, is backed by one of the world’s largest aggregate reserve
holdings of about $85bn). The Korean won too came under extensive pressure in late
October, as the magnitude of the industrial insolvency problems and fragilities of the
closely tied financial sector became apparent. On October 20, the Hong Kong equity
market plunged and a few days later, the Hong Kong dollar too came under attack.
This was despite:40
a) the Hong Kong’s authority’s seeming unwavering commitment to the currency
board system - it was reported that the speculators were ‘testing’ the authority’s
actual commitment to maintaining the peg;
b) its high-level of forex reserves of about $90bn; and
c) the P.R.C. authorities’ public declaration that they stood ready to use China’s





  Pegged to U.S. dollar.
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  In January 1998, the Indonesian currency reached a low of
Rupiah 14,750 per U.S. dollar (a value of  15.5 in the index  terms
used above); its value was Rupiah 11,600 (19.7 in index terms) on
June 5, 1998.
Source:  IMF (1998c).
4. Preliminary Post-Mortem
Between July and December 1997, the median depreciation in the four SEAEs
and Korea was 80 percent. These declines occurred despite a decrease in aggregate
reserve holdings of $22.7bn in 1997 in defending the currencies (compared to a total
increase of $32 bn in the previous two years) (table 7).41
Table 7
Private Capital Flows to the Southeast Asian Economies,
Korea and all Developing Countries, 1995-97
(% of GDP)
Country 1995 1996 1997
Indonesia:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




   6.2
   2.3
   0.7









    1.6
    2.0
   -0.4
    0.1
    1.0
    1.8
Malaysia:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




   8.8
   4.8
   0.0
   4.1
  -0.1
   2.0
   9.6
   5.1
   0.0
   4.5
  -0.1
  -2.5
    4.7
    5.3
    0.0
   -0.6
   -0.1
    3.6
Philippines:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment




    4.6
    1.8
    0.3
    2.4
    1.4
   -0.9
    9.8
    1.6
   -0.2
    8.5
    0.2
   -4.8
    0.5
    1.4
   -5.3
    4.5
    0.8
    2.1
Thailand:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment





    0.7
    1.9
  10.0
    0.7
   -4.4
     9.3
     0.9
     0.6
     7.7
     0.7
    -1.2
  -10.9
     1.3
     0.4
  -12.6
     4.9
     9.7
Korea:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct Investment
  Net portfolio investment




    3.9
   -0.4
    1.9
    2.5
   -0.1
   -1.5
     4.9
    -0.4
     2.3
     3.0
    -0.1
     0.3
      2.8
     -0.2
     -0.3
      3.4
     -0.1
     -1.1
Developing Countries:
Net private capital flows
  Net direct investment
  Net portfolio investment












   42.9
   60.0




    40.6
     -5.3
    17.5
   -55.2
Notes:     a) - denotes a rise and vice versa
Sources:  Compiled by author from IMF (1997a,b and 1998b) 42
The SEAEs along with Korea suffered an aggregate net private capital outflow
of $11.9bn in 1997, compared to an inflow of $93bn in the previous year (table 8 and
chart 20). This worked out to a net outflow of about $105bn in just one year. The
decline was mainly due to commercial banks and other private nonbank financial
institutions refusing to fully renew maturing short-term debt. Altogether, there was a
net  outflow of $26.9bn in 1997, compared to an inflow of $55.7bn in 1996 from
commercial banks. The rest of the decline was largely due to portfolio equity
investment (from a net inflow of $12.4bn in 1996 to a net outflow of $4.3bn in 1997);
while direct equity investment remained stable. Total net external financing remained
positive at $18.1bn (down from $95.2bn in 1996) only because of a massive $30bn
inflow in the form of official assistance under various international and bilateral
support packages. While all SEAEs and Korea were adversely affected, Thailand was
particularly hard-hit, with a net private capital outflow of 10.9 percent of GDP in 1997,
in comparison to a capital inflow of 12.7 percent in 1995 and 9.3 percent in 1996
(table 7 and chart 22).
Chart 21





















Equity Investment Private Creditors Net Private Flows
Notes:  (c)  Estimate; (d) Forecast.
Source:  See Table 843
Table 8
Capital Flows to the Southeast Asian Economies and Korea in Aggregate,
1994-97 ($ billion)






   Equity Investment
      Direct
      Portfolio
   Private Creditors
      Commercial Banks
      Nonbank Private
Creditors
Net Official Flows
   Financial Institutions













   7.3
  -0.4
   7.7
 15.2
  -5.4
   84.6
   79.2
   15.4
     4.9
   10.5
   63.8
   49.9
   13.8
     5.4
    -0.3











   -1.9
   -2.0





     2.1
     6.4
    -4.3
  -14.0
  -26.9
   12.9
   30.0
   22.5
     7.5
  -30.5
   39.5
  25.9
   -0.3
  16.4
    6.9
    9.5
 -16.8
 -19.8
    3.0
   26.2
   23.2
     3.0




Notes: a) Includes other minor components
b) - denotes a rise and vice versa
c) Estimate
d) Forecast
Source: Institute of International Finance (1998)
Chart 22




















Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
       Note:   (a) Period average
          Sources:  See Tables 4  and 744
The IMF, through the accelerated procedures under the auspices of the
Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM), approved stand-by credits totalling about
$35bn for Thailand (August 20, 1997), Indonesia (November 5, 1997) and Korea
(December 4, 1997). Regional and extra-regional parties such as the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) pledged additional aid to the countries, with
capital-exporting countries such as Japan, USA, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore
also contributing. The aggregate IMF-orchestrated bail out packages turned out to be
much larger - in fact the largest in history - estimated at $58bn for Korea, $37bn for
Indonesia and $17bn for Thailand. These compare to about $51bn for Mexico in 1995
(table 9).45
Table 9
IMF-led International Financial Assistance Committed
to Korea, Thailand and Indonesia
a, June-July 1998
($ billions)












IMF disbursements as of 10 June 1998
    20.9
    10.0
      4.0
    23.3
      5.0
    10.0
      6.3
      1.0
      1.0
    58.2









  China, P.R..C.




IMF disbursements as of 15 July 1998
     9.9
     4.5
     3.5
   18.7
     3.0
     5.0
     1.0
     1.0
     1.0
     1.0
     5.0
   36.6









  China, P.R..C.






IMF disbursements as of 15 July 1998
     3.9
     1.5
     1.2
   10.5
     4.0
     1.0
     0.5
     1.0
     1.0
     0.5
     0.5
     1.0
     1.0
   17.1
     2.8
Mexico:
IMF




   17.8
     2.8
   10.0
   20.0
   50.6
Sources: Compiled by author from IMF (1998a), IMF News Briefs, various issues and Goldstein and
Hawkins (1998a)46
As part of the IMF conditionalities, 58 financial companies (specialist lenders)
in Thailand were suspended, with an announcement by the government that a
number of them would be shut-down and their assets sold. 14 of 30 merchant banks
were closed in Korea and the National Assembly passed 18 financial reform bills.
Major IMF-type austerity plans were also announced. Indonesia declared the closure
of 16 of its 240 banks. Malaysia, while not having to depend on IMF assistance, did
defer a number of major projects and the government announced plans to consolidate
the operations of and merge 39 finance companies into just 6. In contrast to other
programs, the IMF stipulations in Asia also focused on issues relating to corporate
governance, bankruptcy laws and other detailed microeconomic reforms. - Indeed,
one of the criticisms of the IMF approach is that it attempted to change too much too
soon, while paying scant attention to individual country circumstances (i.e. a ‘one-
size-fits-all approach’).
After a short respite, in late December 1997 and early January 1998, the
region’s currencies and stock markets came under renewed selling pressure
(Business Times, Singapore, January 14, 1998), with the rupiah most affected, falling
from about 5500 Rupiah per $ in end December 1997 to over 12000 by end January
1998 (chart 20). While the weaknesses in the Thai economy was the reason for the
initial speculative attacks on the region’s currencies, the trigger for this (second) round
was reportedly the announcement of Indonesia’s budget, which was based on overly
optimistic assumptions regarding growth, exchange rate and inflation forecasts. More
generally, there were doubts about the commitment of the Indonesian authorities to
see through the IMF program, presumably because of the extent to which ‘well-
placed’ individuals would be adversely impacted if the IMF-mandated steps such as
financial restructuring, revoking of subsidies to de facto bankrupt banks and other
firms, were undertaken (McLeod, 1997).47
The consequent decline in regional currencies led to a vicious cycle, as the $
indebtedness of the companies in the region (with unhedged loans) had also risen,
resulting in the original bail-out package being insufficient. And, on January 14 1998,
Indonesia renegotiated the terms of agreement with the IMF. In the face of continued
currency weakness of the rupiah and internal socio-political dynamics, Indonesia’s
vacillation with regard to the second deal, along with the recent acute socio-political
turmoil, (which saw Asia’ longest serving leader, Suharto replaced as president by his
vice-president, B.J. Habibie) led to a third, then a fourth - much ‘softer’ (in terms of the
conditionalities) - deal being struck with the IMF in early April and late May
respectively. Given the socio-political tensions that persist in the country, at the time
of writing, many doubts remain as to whether the Indonesian government will follow
through with the necessary structural reforms (Baker, 1998).
Between July 1997 and June 1998, data reveals that the Indonesian rupiah
was hardest hit, plunging about 480 percent from 2600 Rupiah per $ to 15100 per $.
The Thai baht, Malaysia ringgit and Korean won each depreciated by over 55 percent
vis-à-vis the $, while the Philippine peso fell by 45 percent. The Taiwanese and
Singapore dollars each dropped by about 25 percent (chart 20). Frankel and Rose
(1996) have defined a ‘currency crash’ as a nominal bilateral exchange rate
depreciation of at least 25 percent with respect to the $ and at least a 10 percent
increase in the rate of depreciation (the latter condition included to account for
possible trends in nominal depreciation by high inflation countries). On this basis,
save Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (which maintained the currency board-based
peg), all the above countries qualify as having experienced a bona fide currency
crisis. The extent of the REER depreciation of the currencies of the MIT and Korean
economies is clear from table 10. Over a six month period since 1970, Indonesia’s
depreciation as of March 1998 has been the third largest ever, with Korea’s, the
Philippines’ and Thailand’s respectively being the ninth, tenth and thirteenth largest.48
Table 10
Real Effective Exchange Rates: 20 Largest Depreciations since 1970






























































Notes:  a) Data up to March, 1998
 b) - denotes a depreciation
Source:  Goldstein and Hawkins (1998a)
Recent estimates of the depth and costs of financial restructuring are in table
11. Forecasts of regional (GDP) growth in 1998 and 1999 as of July 1997 are
provided in table 12. As can be seen, highly tentative projections for 1998 suggest
that among the countries most afflicted, Indonesia is worst-hit, expected to decline by
15-18 percent with inflation (consumer prices) expected at over 60 percent. Thailand
is projected to see a decline of 7-8 percent with 10 percent projected inflation rate.
Korea’s decline is anticipated at 5-6 percent, also with 10 percent inflation. The
average recovery period for crisis-hit economies in the past has been about 2 to 3
years (World Bank, 1998, pp.119-20). This assumes that countries have steadfastly
seen through the necessary reforms and there are no other adverse shocks, i.e. a so-
called ‘V-shaped’ (as in Mexico and Argentina after the Tequila crisis (see chart 5)).
However, even assuming that the countries follow through with the necessary
structural reforms, there are a number of region-specific factors that give cause for49
particular concern about the Southeast Asian crisis, i.e. a prolonged or ‘U-shaped’
recovery or worse still, an `L-shaped’ one as is being experienced by Japan (chart
23).
Table 11
Recapitalization Needs of Asia’s Banking Sectors, 1998 Estimates
(%)





CAR after NPL Write-Off
Recapitalization Needs
(% of GDP)
  30 - 40
    8 - 10
     -17
      19
   15 - 25
     8 - 14
       -4
       20
     8 - 10
   15 - 18
       10
     none
  25 - 35
   6  - 10
     -10
      30
   20 - 30
     6 - 10
       -11
        30
Notes:  a) Nonperforming loans
b) Capital-asset ratio;
Source: Compiled  by author from JP Morgan (1998) and Nomura (1998b)
Table 12


















   1.6
   0.9
   4.9
  -7.3
   7.2
   1.7
  -0.6
   2.1
   0.6
   3.2
   2.9
   5.1
   1.1
Notes: a) As at July, 1998
Source: The Economist (July, 11, 1998)50
Chart 23
Recovery Period From Financial Crisis (% of Trend Output)
Source: IMF (1998b).
First, as noted, the SEAEs had maintained fairly stable nominal exchange
rates for protracted periods, as a means towards robust export and output growth.
Much faith seemed to have been placed by private sector agents, academics and
policy-makers in the sustainability of this sound economic performance, with the result
that scant attention was paid to some of the warning signs, in Thailand in particular.
The ensuing regional instability consequently came as a major shock, and in turn
probably led to an over-exaggerated response, i.e. a sort of ‘disaster myopia’ took
hold (in jargon, a movement of expectations from a high to low equilibrium) (see
section 5.1).
Second, some concern remains about the possible effects of the weak
regional currencies on the Chinese yuan. In particular, while the initial sharp
devaluation of the yuan in 1994 did not necessarily give the country a major cost
advantage over the SEAE (see footnote 23), it is feared that the continued
weaknesses of these currencies may necessitate a devaluation of the yuan. Indeed,
between December 1996 and December 1997, the yuan has been the only East51
Asian currency to appreciate slightly (0.2 percent) against the $. Given the relatively
higher inflation rate experienced by China (compared to the East Asian economies)
during this period, has meant much higher appreciation of the yuan in real terms (Liu,
et al., 1998). China faces a number of analogous banking and financial sector
problems. How it deals with the issue of currency valuation, possible slow-down in
growth of exports and of foreign investment from the other East Asian economies,
have remained a source of market uncertainty (see for instance, International
Currency Review, April, 1998, pp.3-8). While some confidence may be derived from
recent statements by top ranking Chinese officials of their commitment not to devalue
the yuan (at least this year), continued weakness of the Japanese yen and worsening
growth prospects of the Japanese and regional economies, may force a
reconsideration (we explore this issue below).
Third, as the recent turmoil in Indonesia has made dramatically apparent, the
possibility of socio-political instability is a very real issue. In particular, the legitimacy
and support for most of the political regimes in the region (except the Philippines),
have been based overwhelmingly on robust economic performance. It is as yet
unclear how the people in the region (Indonesia and Korea in particular) will react if
the stagflationary situation continues (escalates?) and workers continue to be
dislocated en masse and remain so indefinitely. The problem could be especially
severe, given the absence of social insurance programs for the unemployed (see for
instance the discussion in The Economist, February 21, 1998, pp.37-8 and the more
detailed investigation by the ILO, 1998). Given two decades of robust growth in the
region on the one hand, and the ‘suddenness’ and ferocity of the crisis on the other,
the potential for further large-scale socio-political cannot and ought not to be easily
discounted.
Fourth, while the general focus (of observers and the IMF) has predominantly
been on the four countries that have received IMF assistance, the aftermath of the
crisis elsewhere in the region seems to have been grossly underestimated.
Indications are that other regional economies like Malaysia and Hong Kong, which52
have enjoyed sustained growth for over a decade, have also entered recessionary
conditions (defined as two quarters of successive negative growth). This is due to the
extremely tight monetary stances maintained in these economies to preclude further
currency runs (particularly in Hong Kong, given the currency board mechanism in
operation), as well as sluggish export growth owing to a lack of regional demand (for
instance, see Goad, 1998).
Fifth, sluggish regional demand due domestic credit crunches has been
exacerbated by the weak yen, a reflection of the outright recessionary condition in
Japan, the first in almost a quarter of a decade. To be specific, as detailed by Rajan
(1998a), the weak yen and sluggish domestic demand in Japan has precluded
economic recovery in East Asia through a number of channels:
a)  the weak yen has partly offset the depreciation of the Korean won and the
Taiwanese $ and therefore their economies’ cost competitiveness (given their
broadly similar comparative advantage).
b) the weak yen has reduced the relative attractiveness of assets in East Asia,
thereby diminishing the incentive for Japan to undertake FDI in the region (so-
termed ‘wealth effect’). This problem is particularly true of China, which, as noted,
is the only country in the region whose currency has not depreciated in nominal
terms since the official devaluation in 1994.
c)  the weak yen and sluggish demand growth in Japan have so far precluded any
sort of economic recovery in the crisis-hit East Asian economies through exporting
to Japan, as part of a broader strategy of “exporting themselves out of trouble”. To
the contrary, the fear is that a weak yen, by making Japanese goods relatively
more competitive, could allow it to expand exports to extra-regional economies at
the expense of the other East Asian economies.
5. What Lessons Are There to Learn?
As discussed, while the final outcome of the crisis remains hazy, the post-
mortem of the SEA crisis seems to point to a number of important lessons for53
economic policy. We note these below in no particular order of importance. A couple
of caveats are warranted before proceeding.
First, there is some overlap in the main conclusions of this section with the
independent studies by Calvo and Goldstein (1996) and Goldstein (1995). Given that
the lessons derived here are largely based on the crisis in Southeast Asia, while those
by Calvo and Goldstein were derived from the Tequila crisis in particular and other
crises prior to that (such as those in the Southern Cone economies), it is surprising
just as to how little learning seems actually to have taken place by all agents
concerned
25. On a more positive note, the robustness of the conclusions and
prescriptions should be encouraging to policy-makers in developing countries in the
sense of being very indicative of potentialities for a crisis and pointing to concrete
steps that might be taken to avoid one from taking place in the future, or reduce its
severity if one does occur.
Second, we highlight what, in our view, are the primary lessons from the crisis.
We do not attempt or claim to be exhaustive, either in terms of the points highlighted,
or in terms of the degree of elaboration of points discussed. The focus is both on
domestic and regional economic policies as well as steps to bolster the international
financial architecture.
5.1 Insights from Multiple Equilibra Models
With the benefit of hind-sight, it has become legion for observers to point to
‘acute’ structural macroeconomic imbalances (such as Thailand’s high current
account deficit) and other economic malaises - mainly in the financial sector - as
‘obvious’ rationale for the ‘inevitability’ of  the crisis. Consider the following conclusion
by an IMF study on the financial sector in developing countries which are members of
                                               
25 This conclusion may admittedly be too harsh. For instance, the Philippines, which as noted,
has hitherto been considered ‘geographically misplaced’ in the sense of being more akin to the
LAEs (in terms of economic performance), has been less impacted by the regional crisis than
the ‘MIT’ economies. Arguably, this may have been due to their experience with previous
crises in Latin America (both the Tequila and the debt crisis of the 1980s). The financial and
banking supervision in particular have been of higher quality than those in the MIT economies.54
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  (which include the SEAEs as well as
some East Asian economies like China and Korea):
The recent history of many of the APEC developing countries, as well
as other evidence, suggests that many of these countries are not well
equipped to manage the increased risks inherent in intermediating
volatile capital flows and to absorb high asset price volatility. Many
financial institutions remain subject to moral hazard...The supervisory
and regulatory infrastructures in APEC developing countries are often
ill-equipped to assess and manage the systematic risks inherent in
immature financial systems, especially in the presence of large and
volatile capital flows.
In the aftermath of the currency and financial turmoil in East Asia, the above
conclusion would seem uncontroversial as a rationalisation of the region’s
weaknesses. There is a slight problem though. The report was published in 1995,
based on data up until 1993 (see Folkerts-Landau and associates, 1995). Recall that
during this period, following the Tequila crisis, East Asia was being glorified by all
quarters (the private sector, World Bank and others), with trend analysis being the
basis of bold projections regarding the region’s economic clout into the next century
26.
In addition, as the analysis in section 2 suggests (and discussed further in
section 7), the weaknesses in the Southeast Asian economies (save possibly for
Thailand) were not of macroeconomic management in ways that caused them to be
unsustainable under normal conditions. Rather, the problems were predominantly
two-fold.
First was the structure of external indebtedness. This was loaded at the short-
end in the case of Thailand and Indonesia in particular, consequently leading to grave
revenue-liability maturity mismatches. This was at least partly due to the combination
of rapid financial deregulation without accompanying strengthening of regulatory and
                                               
26 Undoubtedly much of this praise was deserved, given the countries’ successes in sustaining
rapid economic growth and alleviating poverty over the last two decades.55
supervisory policies (see section 5.3). The high dependence on short term debt
financing made the countries highly susceptible to a sudden liquidity crisis, as foreign
lenders became unwilling to roll over loans in the face of unfavourable shocks.
Second, was the absence of appropriate forex risk management (i.e. currency
hedging) strategies, given the general expectation of the maintenance/sustenance of
the rather rigid pegs of the regional currencies against the $. This meant that the
balance sheets of the indebted firms (as well as financial intermediaries) were highly
vulnerable to sharp exchange rate variations. Thus, with unforeseen and significant
depreciations of regional currencies, a number of firms suddenly found themselves to
be in a state of insolvency
27.
While there was no discernible adverse shift in the regional economies'
macroeconomic data to warrant the extent of capital reversal that took place, and the
magnitude of the socio-economic disturbances that resulted, one key difference
between the earlier years and the last few, was the sharp deceleration in exports
beginning in 1996 (notably in Thailand and less so in Malaysia and some of the other
regional economies). Though this may have been a cyclical phenomenon, insofar as it
occurred during a period of general ‘negative news’, it may have been interpreted as a
personification of deeper structural problems in the region, and made the external
deficits of Thailand in particular seem unsustainable
28. The shock of the devaluation
of the Thai baht validated the negative expectations, leading to a vicious self-fulfilling
spiral.
                                               
27 A similar conclusion is drawn independently by Goldstein and Hawkins (1998).
28 This 'negative news' included political uncertainties, the 'China factor', IMF's warnings
regarding Thailand's relatively high current account deficit, sluggishness in the Japanese
economy, and problems surfacing about the depth of the industrial problems in Korea (in terms
of over-capacity and unprofitability of the major chaebols).56
Against this factual background, is the class of models which allow for multiple
equilibra and show how currency runs may be ‘self-fulfilling’
29. These ‘multiple
equilibra’ models were pioneered by Flood and Garber (1984b) and Obstfeld (1986) in
particular and further stimulated by the European Monetary System (EMS) and the
Mexican Peso collapses in 1992-93 and 1994-95 respectively. While Calvo (1995,
1996) and Krugman (1998) provide succinct summaries of the main elements, three
major insights from the models are particularly relevant for policy.
First, the models are not purely ‘self-fulfilling’ in the sense of being completely
arbitrary. There must exist some weakness in the economic fundamentals of the
country for an attack to occur
30. If the economy is either very ‘good’ or very ‘bad’, it will
respectively never or always be attacked. Thus in the case of East Asia, despite the
regional contagion effects (see section 5.2), it is revealing that the regional economies
with the strongest fundamentals, viz. Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were least
impacted by the turmoil directly
31.
Second, within those two extremes - which imply unique equilibrium (i.e. an
attack with close to 0 or 1 probabilities) - there is a large intermediate range (gray
area). In this range, there may exist some weaknesses in the economy that are
                                               
29 In contrast to these multiple equilibra or sunspot models, there is an older class of models
which posit that currency crises are largely a reflection of inconsistent and unsustainable
macroeconomic policy stances - characterised by burgeoning fiscal deficits which are
monetised, and worsening current account imbalances, overvaluation of the real exchange
rate and eventual loss of international reserves. Seminal work on these models are by
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984a).
30 This is not to say that purely self-fulfilling attacks can never occur, though there is not much
evidence of this once one abstracts from the regional contagian effect. The point is that the
multiple equilibra models do not provide any theoretical/academic justification for drawing such
a conclusion.
31 At the time of writing, there are real doubts about the durability of the Hong Kong board and
the exchange rate peg, given the recessionary effects of interest rate hikes that were effected
in late 1997 to counter speculative attacks on the currencies in East Asia (for instance, see
Saludo and Shameen, 1998). The Singapore economy is projected to grow much more slowly
(if at all) in 1998, while even the Taiwanese economy has seen a reduction - albeit slight - in
projected growth for 1998. However these are indirect fall-outs from (i.e. second-round effects
of) the crisis, rather than the direct (first-round) impact of the speculative currency attacks,
experienced by the SEAEs and Korea.57
neither strong enough to completely preclude a speculative attack on the currency,
nor sufficiently weak to make an attack unavoidable. Rather, there are a multiplicity of
equilibra, such that an economy remains on what seems to be a sustainable path
(‘superior’ equilibrium), until some ‘trigger’ or evidently minor event coalesces market
expectations to an inferior one, that is realised. This ‘bad’ equilibrium then becomes
the absorbing state. The trigger in the case of Thailand seems to have been the sharp
curtailment in export growth (after an average 19 percent growth between 1990 and
1995), along with the spate of financial bankruptcies.
Third, to repeat, the multiple equilibra models suggest that a country with
certain weak fundamentals (‘unwise policies’) may not necessarily be attacked. As
noted nicely by Obstfeld (1998, p.22), “crises may contain a self-fulfilling
element...which can generate multiple equilibra in international asset markets, and
render the timing of crises somewhat indeterminate.” In the case of the SEAEs,
insofar as the ‘fundamentals’ in 1997 were not very different (and in some cases were
better) than in 1995-96 when there was no speculative attack, regional policy-makers
and private sector agents may (understandably) had been lulled into a sense of
complacency (i.e. East Asia was somehow `different’ - superior?).
While the benefits of financial globalisation may potentially be significant
(Obstfeld, 1998 and Rajan, 1998b), given the herd mentality on the part of investors,
any (endogenous) policy slippages or exogenous shocks (even minor ones that are
transitory) could have potentially grave and uncertain consequences for the economy.
In other words, the ‘punishment’ meted out by the financial markets may be far too
severe in comparison to the ‘crime’. This is so, as such flows are based on arbitrage
conditions, viz. ex-ante interest rate differentials. They are therefore affected by both
absolute differentials as well as risk-reward perceptions in the host economy
32 As
such, they could (and do) flow out just as quickly as they flowed in, as investor
                                               
32 In contrast, medium and longer-term capital flows ought to be based on structural factors
like relative marginal products of capital, tax structure, and the like (Larrain, et al., 1997).
Frankel and Rose (1996) find a low ratio of FDI to debt is consistently associated with a high
probability of a currency crash; while Chuhan, et al. (1996) also find FDI to be a more reliable
source of financing.58
perceptions of country prospects change, or there is a rise in yields in the
industrialised economies
33.
Calvo (1995, 1996) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) have formalised how the
presence of large-scale investment alternatives provides investors fewer incentives to
expend resources to learn about individual countries, and conversely makes it rational
for investors to become highly sensitive to even ‘small’ uncertainties in any one
country. Along with the ‘herd mentality’ of investors, these factors make dependence
on shorter-term foreign capital flows hazardous, with countries becoming acutely
susceptible to ‘boom-bust’ cycles
34.
5.2 Regional Contagion: From Tequila to Tom-Yam
The financial crisis in Southeast Asia in particular, and also the Mexican crisis,
emphasise the relevance and pervasiveness of contagion or negative spill-over
effects that are largely regional in scope (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996, Drazen, 1998,
Frankel and Schlumker, 1996 and Masson, 1998)
35. - Thus the terms Tom-Yam and
Tequila respectively. - Following Masson (1998), we may describe contagion as a
                                               
33 In hindsight, it is ironic that Carrasco and Thomas (1996) held up Thailand in
particular as a role model (along with Chile) for other developing economies in
handling foreign capital flows, as it was relatively unaffected by the Tequila crisis. The
same is true of Malaysia, which introduced a two-tier regulatory system in the face of
large-scale capital inflows in 1994.
34 This herd mentality or bandwagon expectations may be rationalised by considering the
incentive structure of fund managers, who are ‘agents’ or ‘trustees’ of the funds under their
control. If a fund manager makes a loss/wrong decision when most other competitors do
likewise, it is unlikely that she will be punished by her institution. On the other hand, if the fund
manager underperforms relative to the competitors, punishment is very likely. Given this, it is
not surprising that the decisions of most fund managers are highly correlated, and thus have
magnified effects on the particular country. These bandwagon effects may also be rationalised
by appealing to the international political economy literature, which would argue that the
existence of foreign investors may act as a signal to other potential investors about the extent
of investment-conduciveness of the country’s overall policy regime. This reduces uncertainty
and therefore increases ex-ante expected returns (see Rajan, 1997 for a model involving FDI).
35 For instance, during the Tequila crisis (mid December, 1994 - April, 1995), Calvo
and Reinhart (1996) reveal the sharp rise in correlation among markets in both the
LAEs as well as those in Southeast Asia. As an aside, the extent of correlation of the
SEAEs with Korea was zero or negative.59
situation where a crisis in one country leads to a jump to a ‘bad’ equilibrium in a
‘neighbouring’ country. What is less clear is the rationale for this. Four possible
reasons are often suggested. The first two have to do with the ‘real’ side of the
economy, while the latter two have to do largely with the ‘financial’ side of the
economy and require some elaboration.
First, and most direct, is the need to remain competitive relative to other
economies with similar areas of comparative advantage (i.e. attack-induced
competitive devaluation)
36.
Second, there may be extensive and growing trade, investment and other
intra-regional interdependence
37.
Third, most extra-regional institutional investors, such as mutual funds, tend to
lump-up sub-regions in the non-industrialised world, rather than make country-specific
evaluations and investments - i.e. region-specific or dedicated funds such as the Asia
Pacific Fund, the Asian Tigers Fund and the like (see Frankel and Schlumker, 1996
for a list of such Asia-based funds). - Insofar as the region is looked upon as an
investment class rather than individual/country-specific emerging markets (i.e. ‘risk
clusters’), a weakness or attack of one country/currency automatically leads to a
revision of assessments and the probability of a similar fate inflicting the regional
countries with broadly similar - actual or perceived - macroeconomic stances. This is
popularly called the ‘wake-up call’ argument. Alternately, this ‘wake-up call’ behaviour
may also refer to the sudden awareness about how little the market participants truly
knew/understood the regional economies, thus indiscriminately downgrading overall
estimations of the risk-return trade-offs.
                                               
36 The broad similarity of comparative advantages of the SEAEs - Thailand and Malaysia
particularly - has been shown to hold, at least ex-post, as measured by revealed comparative
advantage indices (see Kellman and Chow, 1993). Huh and Kasa (1997) and Corsetti, et al.
(1998) formalise the logic of competitive devaluations in East Asia.
37 For instance, it is commonly noted that Japanese FDI in the region has developed an
intricate division of labour based on both horizontal and vertical differentiation in the Southeast
Asian region (see for instance, Aaoki, 1995). This apart, in 1995, about 18 percent of
Thailand’s trade (average of imports and exports) was with the larger ASEAN region (Aoki,
1998).60
Fourth, losses in one market may lead an open-end mutual fund to liquidate
positions in other regional markets. This so-called termed ‘portfolio adjustment’
behaviour may occur for a number of reasons. These include an anticipation of
increased redemptions; the need to cover losses in other crisis-hit market (‘cash-in’
effects); and in order to reduce portfolio risks and increase their liquidity position
(‘flight to safety’ effects).
Masson (1998) defines only the third as pure contagion, with the first two and
fourth referred to as ‘spillovers’. Based on this definition, he has shown how it is
conceptually possible for contagion to increase the ‘grey area’ noted in section 5.1,
thus making countries even more vulnerable to a currency crisis. Significantly, the
argues that it is possible that “(e)ven if each country separately is not subject to
multiple equilibra, together they may be, since the fear of crisis in one will increase the
devaluation probability in the other, making a crisis more likely in both.”
Whatever the exact transmission mechanisms, given the regional dimension of
crises (i.e. a macroeconomic policy slippage in any one country reverberates rapidly
to other countries in region), it is particularly important to ensure that there is some
sort of ‘peer pressure’ or ‘club spirit’ that promotes the pursuit of sustainable and
prudent macroeconomic policies in each country in the region. At a systematic level,
mechanisms that promote regional cooperation and surveillance (i.e. ‘peer pressure’)
to enhance the quality of national macroeconomic management need to be
developed
38.
5.3 The Importance Financial Sector Reforms and Prudential Regulations
While most of the SEAEs have maintained relatively sound macroeconomic
policies, the financial sectors (especially banks) have been grossly underdeveloped.
As noted simply but effectively by the World Bank’s chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz
(1998b, p.66), “(t)he financial system is the ‘brain’ of the economy, mobilising savings
                                               
38 In this light, the expected initiation of a regional monitoring mechanism for ASEAN, initially
by the ADB, but eventually to be transferred to the ASEAN Secretariat in Singapore, is a
welcome initiative.61
and allocating it to investment. When this brain malfunctions, the consequences can
be enormous.”
A general lack of competition (i.e. oligopolistic market structure), directed
lending, ghastly accounting standards, generally weak corporate governance
structures, extremely close connections between bankers and politicians and
consequent inadequate supervision and prudential regulations, have all worked in
tandem to conceal a number of acute vulnerabilities. In this light, the Core Principles
for Effective Banking Agreement released by the Basle Committee in April 1997
relating to capital requirements, limiting politically-motivated/influenced bank lending,
provision for bad loans, rapid and systematic arrangements to deal with insolvent
institutions and so forth, ought to be used as a standard towards which all countries
should aim
39 (see section 5.9).
One of the key messages emanating from the Southeast Asian crisis is that
rapid financial deregulation without an accompanying strengthening of regulatory and
supervisory policies, greatly increases the vulnerability of the domestic economy to
external shocks
40. Given the benefits of an open capital account and a vibrant
financial sector, ensuring the existence of a sound supervisory system is a critical
                                               
39 It is revealing to note that the costs of past banking crises in developed countries ranged
from a high of 17 percent of GDP in the case of Spain (1977-85) to about 3 percent in the case
of the US Savings and Loan (S&L) debacle (1984-91). Those in developing countries were
relatively higher, averaging 25 percent or more in Argentina, Chile and Cote d’Ivoire and
between 10-15 percent in Mexico since 1994 (Goldstein and Turner, 1996, pp.5-6). Also see
World Bank (1998, table 14). Table 11 provides the most recent estimates of the
corresponding costs for Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Indonesia.
40 The importance of sound supervisory arrangements as a sine qua non of financial sector
deregulation is underscored by the fact that Singapore, which is the smallest and most open
economy in the region (in terms of trade and capital flows), and also has the most
sophisticated and effective financial sector prudential requirements (relatively speaking), was
among the least affected by the crisis. At the other extreme, economies like China and India
(as well as the rest of South Asia) were not impacted directly by the crisis, due to their heavily
regulated and autarkic regimes. More revealing is the study by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996),
which found that of the 25 banking crises under investigation, 18 had undertaken financial
liberalisation some time during the previous five years. Significantly, while there was no
apparent link between balance of payments crises and banking crises in the 1970s when
financial markets were highly regulated, they did become very closely connected in the 1980s,
a period which involved large-scale financial deregulation. See Garcia and Lindgren (1998) for
a highly readable summary and Goldstein and Turner (1996) for a detailed discussion.62
point for other developing economies as they contemplate such deregulation. Failing
this, the domestic financial sector will be highly susceptible to a financial and currency
collapse (with consequent damaging effects on the real economy). Part of the blame
for the Asian crises must be borne by international institutions like the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and the IMF and US international economic policy. All have
repeatedly urged rapid financial sector deregulation and capital account liberalisation
of the developing Asian economies (as well as the world in general), without providing
adequate (if any) warnings about the need for accompanying prudential reforms
(Claessens and Glaessner, 1997, Rodrik, 1998 and Wade and Veneroso, 1998)
41.
5.4 Role of IMF Revisited
The quick approval and disbursement of financial assistance by the IMF
suggests that it has developed a fairly good ‘rapid crisis-management’ system to
respond to an impending crisis. It must also be acknowledged that the IMF’s ‘early
warning’ surveillance procedures seem to have generally performed well, because as
noted, they had cautioned Thailand early on of the dangers of running a large current
account deficit which was financed by short-term external debt. The issue then is one
of how to ensure that countries are made to take heed of the IMF’s warnings. In the
case of Thailand, insofar as the potential economic vulnerabilities were not reflected
in IMF’s original country growth forecasts, its warnings about the Thai economy
probably lacked credibility (especially against the background of large current account
deficits historically and fast and sustained export and GDP growth)
42. Accordingly,
                                               
41 Conversely, Goldstein and Turner (1996, p.44) have rightly noted that if financial sector
liberalisation is undertaken prior to upgrading of the supervisory and regulatory framework,
there may be a second best argument for maintaining restraints on the capital account.
42 This is more than can be said of  the World Bank, which in 1993 came out with a much-
publicised study entitled the East Asian Growth Miracle or the ADB. The latter, while
mentioning the Thailand’s current account deficit in the annual issue of the Asian Development
Outlook 1996 and 1997, took pains to suggest why it was not necessarily problematic,
concluding of the current account deficit that “the present strength of the Thai economy
indicates that the country should have no major difficult in financing it” (ADB, 1996, pp.107).
Similarly, in Asian Development  Outlook 1997 and 1998 was the following conclusion of
Thailand - “The economy is widely perceived to be sound, and action by the authorities has63
consideration may be given to developing scenario-based forecasts for the
government officials of countries that are perceived as potentially vulnerable.
Another problem that needs to be resolved is the criticism made of the IMF
that by entering the picture fairly swiftly and very publicly (over-aggressively?), it may
have negatively impacted general private sector perceptions of the depth and breadth
of the crisis, thus causing the markets to sharply overreact
43. To the extent that this is
true, it may discourage countries from approaching the IMF until the situation has
deteriorated to such as extent that there is no alternative
44. - As noted by Radelet and
Sachs (1998b, p.33), “(t)he arrival of the IMF gives all the confidence of seeing an
ambulance outside one’s door.” - A judicious balance needs to be struck between the
need for rapid crisis management on the one hand and the dangers of fuelling bearish
expectations (self-fulfilling prophecies) or exaggerating the magnitude of the problems
on the other
45.
5.5 Moral Hazard Problems
There is the classic moral hazard problem involved, in the sense that the
relative rapidity with which the IMF, other regional/multilateral agencies and capital-
exporting countries have lent to the indebted country may lead potential creditors in
the future to pay scant attention to the possible risks of default on foreign lending. In
other words, such ‘bail out’ packages may engender a ‘heads I win - tails you lose’
                                                                                                                                       
probably avoided a broader monetary crisis such as that experienced by Mexico in 1994.”
(ADB, 1997, p.104).
43 An argument may be made that this publicity by the IMF was aimed at justifying its
relevance at a time when many doubts have been expressed ever more frequently, both by
policy-makers (especially in the US) as well as some academics, about the need for such an
institution in the contemporary world economy.
44  There were also some clear policy mistakes, such as the demand for immediate bank
closures in Indonesia, which probably  precipitated an acute investor panic, with two thirds of
all banks reportedly experiencing bank-runs on their deposits. (Sanger, 1998).
45 Goldstein and  Calvo (1996) go into greater detail about IMF surveillance, early warning
system and their role as crisis ‘manager’ and ‘preventor’.64
attitude in anticipation of another IMF-orchestrated bail out
46. The issue is especially
important in the current context, as the indebtedness in the SEAEs has been largely
due to the private sector, as opposed to the sovereign debt problems in Latin America
in the early 1980s
47. The moral hazard problem on the part of the (potential) debtor
countries seems to be over-rated. This is so, as all severely indebted crisis-hit
countries have gone through deep recessionary period on the one hand, and the
governments in-charge during the crisis have faced a battery of criticisms for the
policies that led to such a situation. One would assume that these would be sufficient
disincentives from undertaking policies that consciously court severe indebtedness
and a consequent bail out.
5.6 Stability versus Growth: Solving the External Private Sector Debt 
Overhang
The IMF has come under severe criticism for its blanket imposition of the usual
conditionalities on the Asian countries in the form of tight demand management
policies. Critics have argued that such orthodox conditionalities are not meaningful in
the case of Southeast Asian crisis, where the Thailand and Indonesia in particular
have run fiscal surpluses (though there is the issue of contingent liabilities and off-
budget measures). - Malaysia also ran fiscal surpluses, but it did not go to the IMF for
assistance. - Insofar as there has been some softening of the fiscal balance targets
set by the IMF (especially in the case of Indonesia), probably more contentious at
present, is the role of monetary policy.
On the one hand, the IMF-Treasury complex has steadfastly emphasised the
need for the economies to maintain tight monetary policy stances to stave off the
                                               
46 Indeed, it has been suggested that the Mexican bailout in 1995 was a precursor to the
current regional crisis in East Asia, as foreign creditors/investors anticipated further
international assistance in case of a crisis. Accordingly, little regard may have been paid to the
risks involved in their investments (Calomoris, 1998).
47 For instance, about 50 percent of Indonesia’s external debt is private corporate debt, the
figures being slightly over 70 percent for Thailand and about 90 percent for Korea respectively
(Nomura, 1998b).65
possibility of capital flight and concomitant currency depreciations and greater inflation
(see the IMF’s Stanley Fischer, 1998 and US Treasury Secretary’s Robert Rubin,
1998). On the other, a number of critics - among them, the World Bank’s Joseph
Stiglitz (1998b) and Sachs and Radelet (1998a,b) - have argued for the need to relax
this policy in order to prevent an output and employment collapse, as has been
happening in the region (Handley and Koo, 1998 and Wade and Veneroso, 1998).
According to research by Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, over one quarter of all
corporate borrowers in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea do not have enough cash flow
to cover their interest liabilities (Lo, 1998). As companies get pushed from illiquidity to
insolvency, this has raised the nonperforming loans and contributed to a deepening of
the financial sector fragilities. These, along with accompanying recessionary
conditions, may themselves act as a negative signal to investors, hence actually
encouraging further capital flight. In other words, an ‘overly’ tight monetary policy is as
or more dangerous than one that is very loose
48.
The liquidity squeezes have stymied the goal of generating export revenues as
part of a strategy to export the countries/firms out of the debt burdens (by bankrupting
a number of firms which have not been able to raise the required working capital). To
make matters worse, no clear solution has been offered (by the IMF-Treasury) about
way of dealing with the mountainous foreign debt obligations of the companies
49. This
has only added to market uncertainty, while reducing incentives to undertake
necessary reforms that promote growth
50. There is a need to establish systematic and
                                               
48  As of August 1998, short-term interest rates stood at over 50 percent in Indonesia, 16
percent in Thailand, and an average of about 12 percent in Korea, Malaysia and the
Philippines (Nomura, 1998a).
49 Recent initiatives have been taken to restructure the external debts of Korea, Indonesia and
Thailand. For instance, Indonesia’s private external debt is to be restructured to an eight years
maturity, along the lines of Mexico’s Ficorca Plan (Nomura, 1998b).
50 If there is one, it has not been adequately revealed to the public. Such secrecy only
serves to exacerbate uncertainties, and is inconsistent with the IMF’s push for greater
transparency of data and other pertinent information about developing countries. In
fact, in response to some of these criticisms, the IMF’s External Relations Department
put out a communiqué entitled “IMF Bail Outs: Truth and Fiction” to ‘clarify’ the terms
of the IMF’s bail out package (put out on their homepage on the world-wide web). The66
formal guidelines to work-out viable private sector debt restructuring arrangements
(including debt forgiveness). The governments must attempt to encourage mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) of the indebted firms (domestic or international). The
economic attractiveness and viability of some firms may be enhanced by removing
price controls or other tariffs if they exist. Remaining firms must be divided into those
that are solvent but illiquid and those that are insolvent
51.
5.6.1    Insolvent versus Illiquid Firms
Insolvent firms must be allowed to go bankrupt, with a ‘fire-sale’ of productive
assets to pay back the international lenders (there is also a need for putting in place
effective bankruptcy laws)
52. All creditors may however not be paid in full. Given that
these are private sector transactions, such risks are inevitable and ought not to be the
concern of the governments or international agencies. Admittedly, any private sector
debt default could lead to a larger country risk premium in the future (see section 5.7),
which makes the financing costs of external funding of all firms in the countries much
higher. Importantly though, this ought to reduce the moral hazard problem on the side
of the lenders. In the medium and longer-terms, systematic bankruptcy mechanisms
to ensure greater ‘flexibility’ in the economic structures must be designed (see general
discussion in Daniels, 1997).
Illiquid firms that are not part of a M&A or some sort of privately-initiated
venture, could be provided credit at commercial rates for its working capital needs by
the government (which could as a conduit for channelling funds from international
                                                                                                                                       
IMF has grandly referred to the focus on the financial sector and corporate
governance issues as the ‘second generation’ reforms, a contrast to predominant
focus on fiscal complicity as typified their (‘first generation’) programs.
51 At a time of rapidly depreciating currencies and firms with foreign denominated liabilities, it is
admittedly very difficult to make this distinction. It becomes necessary to make a judgement
about the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate at which to value the net worth of the
firms in local currency terms. The problem is particularly true of Indonesia, given the virtual
collapse of the currency.
52 Krugman (1998c) discusses the welfare implications of the fire-sale of assets by crisis-hit
countries to foreigners.67
agencies such as the ADB and the World Bank). More systematic and transparent
agreements of the terms under which short-term debts are to be converted to
longer-term ones (such as the Brady Plan under which banks negotiate debt and debt
service reduction agreements that involve a market-based menu of options are
needed). The ad-hoc manner in which such rolling-over seems to be the current
vogue, is obviously not conducive to market stability. Much can be learnt from the
huge literature that developed in the 1980s, motivated by the Mexican debt crisis.
Issues that have been discussed relate to debt forgiveness versus financing and
types of financing (government-led versus private sector initiative), and balancing the
goals of reducing debt overhang and ensuring economic growth (see the succinct
summary by Carmichael, 1989).
5.6.2    A Note on Problem-Banks
In most of these countries, bank liabilities are perceived as being contingent
liabilities of the government. While there is an obvious moral hazard problem involved
in the case of the bank authorities, arguably such implicit or explicit government
protection may have encouraged household savings, hence partly contributing to the
oft-noted high private (non-mandatory) savings in the region. Given the presumption
(or actuality) of such guarantees, the bank liabilities ought - at least partially - to be
‘socialised’ (i.e. taken over by the government as part of the fiscal balance), and
banks recapitalised. Such a commitment must also be publicly announced to prevent
bank runs or other social instabilities (as happened in Indonesia), as well as to ensure
the maintenance of high private rates of savings (internal finance taking on especially
portentous dimensions during crisis periods)
53. The losses associated with such
insolvencies must be shared by a combination of tax-payers (government) and agents
                                               
53 Mody and Patro (1996) discuss methods of valuing such government loan guarantees,
methods of accounting which are designed to anticipate losses, risk valuation and ensuring
maximum transparency. Krugman (1998a,b) provides a theoretical framework to discuss the
economic effects of such government guarantees in terms of fuelling asset inflation because of
moral hazard problems.68
linked to the banks (Daniels, 1997). Since such a move will increase the respective
government’s indebtedness, the IMF’s prescription of fiscal stringency in this case
becomes necessary. However such a lender-of-last-resort role must be publicly and
clearly eschewed in the future, as it distorts incentives of the commercial banking
agents to monitor the quality of loans (including maturity and currency mismatches).
If the above concrete steps towards restructuring are undertaken, and are
seen as being credible/durable, there ought to be far greater scope for a relaxation of
the tight macroeconomic stance (credit policies in particular) early on, without
jeopardising the goals of exchange rate and price stability. The improvement in
domestic absorption (and thus market confidence) in the short-term should in turn
make restructuring less painful, possibly enhancing its pace.
5.6.3    Time for an Asian Bond Market
Another important step may involve the development of a regional bond
market Such a market could play two important roles. First, it would assist in the goal
of immediate liquidity-provision for some of the solvent, but cash-strapped firms.
Second, it would enhance the transparency of the companies’ balance sheet
activities, as well as act as a broader indicator of the health of the macroeconomy
(particularly credit risks and inflationary pressures). Third, risk aversion by banks, as
well as the dangers of short-term lending on the one hand, and the continued
infrastructural needs of some of the countries in the region on the other, necessitate
the creation of a bond market for long-term funding.
The development of bond markets has hitherto been precluded due to the lack
of need by regional governments to borrow (given the fiscal surpluses they ran) on the
one hand, and the prevailing corporate governance structures (i.e. close-knit family-
linked or government-based), along with easy accessibility to sources of finance
(during the boom period until mid 1997) on the other. Given that both of the above
have become far less of a ‘constraint’ in the aftermath of the regional crisis, as well as
the existence of high private savings rates on the other (thus providing a potential69
demand for such financial products), this would seem to be an opportune time to
seriously consider its establishment. Indeed, government bonds could create a yield
curve from which private sector/corporate bonds could be priced.
5.7 Negative Externality of Foreign Borrowing
As alluded to above, external borrowing entails a negative externality or
‘contamination effect’, which arises due to the existence of a country risk premium
that is an increasing function of aggregate external indebtedness. This drives a wedge
between the marginal private and social (or aggregate) external borrowing costs
(Harberger, 1980), and points to the need for some sort of tax on external
borrowings
54. The contamination effect also suggests that it is not merely the sizes of
the fiscal deficit or public debt that ought to be considered, but rather, those of the
current account deficit per se and aggregate external debt (see section 5.9 and
appendix 2). Accordingly, the so-called Lawson doctrine on the current account deficit
(noted in section 2.1) is clearly fallacious and even perilous, as investors seem to be
concerned with aggregate country risk, as opposed to just the sources of potential risk
(as crudely measured by the extent of the fiscal deficit or public debt that is externally
financed).
There has been an increasing dependence by firms and governments on
global capital markets for financing needs. Added to this is the ‘overborrowing
syndrome’ highlighted and formalised by McKinnon and Pill (1996), whereby
overoptimistic beliefs in future growth prospects (‘mania’) of an ‘emerging market’,
along with implicit or explicit deposit insurance, may lead to an excessive external
debt accumulation by economic agents. However, unforeseen shocks which change
market sentiments (due to adverse terms of trade shocks, export growth slowdown,
and the like) may quickly lead to previous investment commitments being perceived
                                               
54 Apart from raising the costs of short-term borrowing through the mandatory one year
depositing of the funds interest-free as previously noted, Chilean firms and financial institutions
are only allowed to avail themselves of the global capital markets if they are rated at levels at
least as high as Chilean government bonds (also see footnote 55).70
as unprofitable, and the current account deficit seen as ‘unsustainably large’. In such
a case, potentially solvent projects may face acute liquidity constraints, as lenders
curtail financing. Indeed, either due to currency devaluations which are unhedged or
deep recessionary conditions with concomitant markets share losses, these liquidity
problems could eventually escalate into solvency ones (as in Southeast Asia). This
problem is particularly acute when the external deficits are financed by short-term
borrowing. It is therefore not surprising to note that both Thailand and Mexico had in
common heavy concentrations of short-term, foreign currency denominated debt.
As such, developing countries must develop a judicious external debt
management policy. In addition to the actual level of aggregate external debt,
particular attention must be paid to the composition of external liabilities in terms of
maturity as well as currency denominations (to the extent that forex exposures cannot
to perfectly hedged, especially in developing countries with rudimentary capital
markets). Prudence suggests the imposition of ceilings, tariffs, marginal reserve
requirements of foreign loans that vary inversely with the length of maturity of the
external debt (as done by Colombia
55), or other provisions that somehow manipulate
corporate tax deductions on the basis of short-term debt holdings. While more
conservative policies that promote longer-term, domestic debt in preference to short-
term, foreign currency denominated liabilities are a relatively costlier source of
financing, they should be seen against the mounting evidence of a bunching of the
latter as being a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for a currency crisis
56 (see
                                               
55 Specifically, the reserve requirements on loans in Colombia apply to all loans with maturities
of five years or less, and are maintained for the entire duration of the loan. The percentage
requirement is inversely related to the maturity of the loan. A rate of 140 percent is applied to
loans that are thirty days or less (i.e. virtually restrictive) in maturity, falling to a low of 42.8
percent for loans with maturity of five-years (Edwards, 1998 and Reinhart and Smith, 1997). In
contrast, Chile imposes an across-the-board 30 percent non-remunerated reserve requirement
on all inflows, which have to be deposited at the central bank. Reinhart and Smith (1997) find
that the controls are effective in terms of altering the composition of flows (to longer
maturities), though not necessarily in terms of curtailing capital inflows per se.
56 See Kiguel (1998) for a discussion of some of these issues in the context of Argentina’s
recent experience with debt management.71
section 5.9). As best said by Goldstein and Calvo (1996, p.77), “host countries should
avoid being penny wise and pound foolish in their debt management practices.”
5.8 Sand in the Wheels of International Finance
Apart from short-term external debt, both the Thai and Mexican cases reveal
the dangers of allowing unfettered capital flows of a short-term nature in general (i.e.
equity along with debt). Accordingly, proposals for some sort of ‘prudential’
intervention to slow the speed and magnitude of cross-border short-term capital flows
seem to have merit. We are in favour of at least re-examining the possibility – mooted
originally in 1972 by Nobel Laureate James Tobin - of a levy on the purchase and sale
of forex internationally (Tobin, 1978, 1996 and Kaul, et al., 1996). A Tobin tax is
essentially a permanent, uniform, ad-valorem transaction tax on international forex
flows. While this issue is the particular focus of Rajan (1998b), some important points
may be noted here.
First, the theoretical rationale (outlined in sections 5.1 and 5.2), and lessons
drawn from the Thai crisis and accompanying Tom-Yam effect, as well as the ERM
and Mexican-Tequila crises that preceded it, seem to provide justification for at least
considering the possible imposition of some form of restraints on international capital
flows. To summarise, the rationale for such levies are based on the existence of
capital market distortions. These include existence of multiple equilibra in forex
markets (particularly given contagion effects), herd behaviour and the possible ‘over
borrowing’ syndrome due to incomplete domestic financial reform, including
inadequate prudential regulations (also see Eichengreen, 1996 and Stiglitz, 1998a).
Second, such policies will probably be far more successful in (and ought to be
aimed at) moderating (short-term) surges in capital inflows (especially debt financing),
rather than outflows
57. In other words, the aim should be to prevent excessive ‘booms’
                                               
57 Malaysia is a good case in point. In 1993-94, faced with massive capital inflows, the
Malaysian authorities implemented policies to dampen these inflows with a fair amount of
success. However the curbs set in place in late 1997 to moderate these outflows were largely72
from occurring in the first instance, rather than attempting to eliminate the ‘busts’ that
invariably follow.
Third, such policies should not to be considered (at least publicly) at a time of
a crisis. This will only exacerbate an already bearish and uncertain situation (see
footnote 57).
Fourth, by no stretch are such curbs offered as panacea for international
financial crises. The primary focus must be on getting the ‘fundamentals’ right.
However, the point is worth repeating that both theory and real world experiences
suggest that ‘fairly’ sound economic fundamentals are necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for invulnerability from a currency and financial crisis. 
5.9 Creation of a World Financial Organisation (WFO)/Extension of Role and
Mandate of the BIS
In light of the negative economic repercussions (including the high bail out
costs) of financial crises, there seems to be a case for giving due consideration to the
establishment of a World Financial Organisation (WFO), as recently proposed by a
United Nation’s-Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
(Reuters, June 15, 1998). Preferably (given the need to minimise
overlapping/duplication of activities, thus reducing resource wastage) and probably
more feasible (given the political economy considerations in getting countries - the US
in particular - to agree to creating an entirely new international institution), might be an
appropriate extension of the mandate, resources and authority of the BIS (which
currently has ‘no teeth’). The WFO/BIS can be placed in charge of ensuring that
member countries work towards the development of healthy banking and financial
sectors. This would complement the surveillance and information dissemination roles
of the IMF. The WFO/BIS may also to be placed in charge of determining appropriate
external debt ceilings of various maturities of the countries (which could vary
                                                                                                                                       
unsuccessful, and probably intensified the bearishness. This is consistent with cross-country
experiences with capital restraints (Folkerts-Landau and Ito, 1995).73
depending on economic circumstances)
58. This role becomes particularly important,
given that it is always possible for governments (with short time horizons) under
political or other pressures or motives, to find ways to circumvent their own ceilings on
external borrowings. The WFO/BIS could work with the WTO to ensure that
agreements aimed at financial deregulation are accompanied by appropriate
supervisory arrangements.
Apart from ex-ante monitoring regulating, in case of an actual financial crisis,
the WFO/BIS may be placed in charge of developing and initiating effective and
systematic debt workouts owed by the private sector (given that the IMF mandate
pertains only to sovereign debt). At least a portion of the financing of the WFO/BIS
could be from the revenues that may be generated from the Tobin tax noted above
59.
An additional source may be the ‘insurance’ premiums paid by international banks
that would like to be part of the creditor consortium which may benefit from direct
negotiations between the WFO and the indebted country (firms within the country) at
a time of crisis
60. There are admittedly a whole host of other modalities relating to
funding, determining the appropriate division of labour between this and other
international economic agencies, and the like, that need to be sorted out. While a
discussion of these are clearly beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to note here
that the frequency and depth of banking and financial crises and the knock-on effect
they have on the real economy, emphasises that serious consideration of these
issues is long overdue.
                                               
58 Financial gurus, George Soros and Henry Kaufman have respectively also suggested an
international credit insurance corporation and international supervisory structure (Grenville,
1998). As envisioned above, the WFO may fulfil both the insurance and supervisory roles.
59 Based on 1995 figures, broad consensus estimates - given a tax rate of 10 to 25 basis
points - are for anywhere between $140 to $300bn to be generated annually (Bird, 1998).
60 There are obviously all sorts of adverse selection and moral hazard problems involved if
banks are allowed to become ‘members’. These and obviously many more issues will need to
be scrutinised heavily in future work.74
5.10 The Current Account Deficit and Indicators of Financial Crises
Large current account deficits are usually seen as among the leading
indicators of an impending balance of payments or financial crises. However, as
noted, the current account deficits in the SEAEs were present during the Mexican-
crisis on the one hand, while countries like Brazil, which did experience much
turbulence at that period, had fairly modest current account deficits. Similarly,
Malaysia’s deficits had fallen significantly in 1996 relative to the previous year, yet it
was still negatively impacted
61,62. A major difference between the two periods as far
as the SEAEs were concerned, was the anticipated future export growth prospects.
Specifically, while projections for export growth were fairly high during the 1994-95
period, recall that 1996 saw a sharp decline in export growth. As noted by Ostry
(1997, p.20), the “(r)apid growth of exports  - which continues, with investment, to be
the main engine of growth in these countries, gives confidence to market participants
that current account deficits will remain sustainable in the future.”
Against this background, as detailed in appendix 2, a seemingly useful
indicator of external creditworthiness or potential vulnerability is a so-termed
‘asymptotic liabilities-export ratio’ (ALER) a la Dadush, et al. (1994, pp.17-8), which
relates the current account deficit to expected export growth. However, as with any
other single indicator, the ALER is not fool-proof. Rather, it ought to be used as part of
an ‘early-warning system’, consisting of composite leading indicators a la Kaminsky
(1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). The indicators may be useful in
capturing/highlighting potential vulnerabilities that could forebode a crisis, so that
policy-makers may adopt appropriate pre-emptive measures
63.
                                               
61 Admittedly, both the Brazilian and Malaysian cases may be partly rationalised by
the contagion effects elaborated in section 5.2.
62 Frankel and Rose (1996) are among many who have failed to discern any
systematic relationship between the size of the external current account deficit and a
currency crisis (also see World Bank, 1998, pp.31-3).
63 According to the composite leading indicators developed by Kaminsky (1997), preliminary
data suggests that the probabilities of crises in Indonesia and Malaysia were lower than they
were in Thailand and the Philippines. While the conclusion regarding the Philippines’75
5.11 Transparency and Quality of Economic Data and Analysis
  There is an urgent need for a much greater degree of transparency in
economic data and general public documentation of economic and financial activities
in the region
64. The authorities in the region have tended to be less than forthcoming
about their economic and financial situations, and have used economic data as a
strategic tool rather than a public good, while the corporate governance structures
involving family-controlled or government-related corporate structures have lacked
transparency, obfuscating gross malaises. Timely and accurate data are essential if
foreign investors and lenders are to be able to make rational and economically-viable
decisions, with reasonably accurate perceptions of risks and benefits. This may
lessen the possibility of sharp and abrupt alterations in market perceptions and
expectations. Against this background, the IMF’s recent data dissemination standard
aimed at encouraging timely, accurate and public availability of broad macroeconomic
data by member countries, is an important step, as is the need to encourage its wide-
spread/universal adoption by member countries
65.
Related to the above, the quality of economic and credit analyses and general
research in the public, private and academic spheres needs to be substantially
enhanced. In addition to the human capital requirements, arguably of equal
importance is the willingness of the governments in the region to allow analysts to
discuss possible problems in an open and candid manner. The perception by the
                                                                                                                                       
vulnerability is dubious, the robustness regarding Thailand being the most susceptible is
notable.
64 For instance, as noted, one was not able to obtain a reliable breakdown of capital
flows into Thailand between FDI and loans (see footnote 12).
65 While more and better quality data is better than less, one wonders if, in the final analysis,
this will necessarily be all that useful. This is so, given the incentive compatibility problems that
seem to operate among private sector analysts and the environment in which they function.
Consider the following quote by Henry Kaufman:
Every firm wants to do deals in emerging markets when margins are high.
Analysts become part of the deal-making and are reluctant to speak up about
problems that might derail a deal. They are also under pressure from sales
and corporate finance executives to come up with ideas that might lead to a
sale, not ideas that might stop one (quoted in Calvo and Goldstein, 1996).76
governments that non-commissioned economic reports that highlight potential
weaknesses in the economy are politically motivated or generally ill-intentioned, is
inconsistent with their ambitions of becoming/remaining global and vibrant economies.
5.12 Sterilisation and Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
The ‘boom-bust’ cycle faced by Thailand in particular, but also the other
SEAEs, is by no means unique to them. This has been recognised as one of the main
dangers and policy dilemmas of an open capital account (Rodrik, 1998). In addition to
the need for sound financial prudential regulations to ensure that funds are
‘appropriately’ intermediated, the regional financial crisis has revealed the dangers of
sustained sterilisation of capital inflows. Specifically, while useful at a time of
transitory capital inflows, sterilisation, if done on a sustained basis, will lead to the
rapid build-up of forex reserves and keep interest rates high (see footnote 14). This in
turn encourages domestic firms to borrow from abroad and conversely encourages
foreign lending. The only viable option for an economy faced with such incipient
balance of payments surpluses is to allow for nominal exchange rate adjustments
(appreciation) to act as a buffer against the ebb and flow of capital movements.
Given the virtual absence of worries about currency fluctuations relative to the
$, a fixed rate system was also the reason for ‘over-borrowing’ by (or ‘over-lending’ to)
the SEAEs, as well as rudimentary corporate risk management strategies by firms. If
the macroeconomic policies are inconsistent with the prevailing peg, and to the extent
that other domestic prices and costs are sticky in the short and medium terms, that
would lead to exchange rate misalignments, which get magnified in open global
capital markets and are difficult to undo (given that devaluation becomes a highly
political issue)
66. Consequently, maintaining a rigid peg is particularly inviting to
                                               
66 Consider the following quote by James Tobin (1998, p.8) regarding a pegged exchange rate
system:
(A) discrete change in an official parity is...traumatic. It is a loss of face and a
blow to pride. It is an administrative decision, that is to say a decision of policy
and politics. It necessarily requires responsible officials - finance ministers,
chancellors, central bank chairmen - to go back on their solemn word.
Moreover, they or their successors have the unenviable task of choosing a77
speculative attacks - which involve selling the currency short - as in the absence of
any risk of currency appreciation, the only cost of short selling a currency is that
incurred in initially borrowing the currency (i.e. a ‘one way’ or ‘sure’ bet) (see appendix
3)
67.
While the SEAEs have hitherto very successfully maintained pegged
exchange rates, the current weakness in most of the currencies will preclude attempts
to return to a fixed rate anytime in the near future. Any attempt to do so will lack
credibility. At least for the medium-term, the regional economies - with the possible
exceptions of those with ‘adequate’ reserves and equally importantly, monetary
authorities with sufficient credibility to back their currency pegs - ought to maintain a
flexible exchange rate regime
68,69. Benassy-Quere (1997) has highlighted the
important point that exchange rate pegs in Southeast Asia have been based almost
solely on trade (exports) weights without any regard to currency denomination of debt
                                                                                                                                       
new rate in a climate poisoned by distrust, clouded by uncertainties about the
fundamentals, and dominated by unpredictable psychology. It’s easy to get
the choice wrong, prolonging and aggravating the crisis. For all these reasons,
there is great temptation to stick with an overvalued parity too long.
67 Arguably, if Thailand had allowed for a sufficiently large nominal depreciation of the baht
(which would have happened under a free float) in mid 1995 when the $ appreciated relative to
the yen, it and regional economies may not have been faced with the current crisis (or at least
the resulting severity). Sachs, et al. (1996a,b) and Calvo and Goldstein (1996), among many
others, have arrived at a similar conclusion regarding Mexico and its 1994-95 crisis.
68 See Asian Monetary Monitor (July-August, 1994, pp.1-10) and Reisen (1994) for broadly
similar conclusions for the SEAEs. In fact, Glick, et al. (1995) argue that policies of pegging
exchange rates in East Asia were of little benefit in terms of keeping inflation down (this goal
being attained primarily due to other factors such as relative autonomy of monetary
authorities). Rather, it may have acted as a liability, as it prevented the necessary adjustments
in response to external shocks.
69 Asian Monetary Monitor (July-August, 1994, pp.1-10) has suggested the other extreme of a
currency board as a possible option for the Asian economies. Indeed, such a proposal was
under serious consideration by Indonesia during the early part of 1998. However this option
can only be considered in the much longer-term once a significant degree of stability has been
reached in the region. This is so for a number of reasons. First, during a period of market
uncertainty (especially when the market is thin), no one is certain as to the appropriate
exchange rate at which the currency ought to be pegged. Second, a currency board requires
the presence of adequate reserves. Third, a currency board automatically requires that interest
rates be hiked to a level adequate to maintain the peg in case of a currency run. Insofar as the
countries are currently in recessionary states, and the banking sectors are already terribly
fragile, there is the very real question of whether the governments will be willing to allow for
such a policy if required (i.e. the policy/permanence of the institutional structure lacking
credibility).78
obligations. This proved particularly problematic, given that while the US was a
primary export market, a substantial portion of the debt was denominated in yen. In
light of the relative difficulty in deciding the ‘optimal’ peg (given the trade-off between
export competitiveness and external debt management), this provides further reason
to allow for a freely floating exchange rate.
While a discussion and formalisation of issues relating to flexible exchange
rates in the context of global capital markets may be found in Rajan (1998b), it is
useful to add an important caveat here. The flexible versus floating dichotomy refers
to the degree of exchange rate flexibility and central bank ‘philosophy’ rather than
being an ‘either-or’ choice. Specifically, no country has a genuinely free floating
currency, with exchange rate considerations almost always being taken into account
when deciding on the appropriate monetary policy stance (Obstfeld, 1998).
6. Concluding Observations
Three broad factors in the global economy seem to account for the rapid pace
of financial globalisation. First, are the major advances in information technologies,
global communications and other new financial instruments and risk management
techniques. Second, a number of developing and former socialist (i.e. ‘emerging’)
economies have undertaken, at various paces and degrees, steps towards economic
and financial liberalisation. Third, over the last decade, institutional investors
(especially US mutual funds) have been consciously diversifying their portfolios
internationally.
Thus, while the process of financial globalisation ought to continue with all the
concomitant benefits, like anything else, it is not an unmixed blessing. As in the case
of Sachs et al.’s (1996b) conclusion of the Mexican crisis and the accompanying
Tequila effect, our analysis indicates that the collapse of the Thai baht and particularly
the broader Tom-Yam effect, may be best characterised as being of ‘sudden death’,
rather than ‘death foretold’. This is broadly consistent with the multiple equilibra
models which emphasise the possibility that some extraneous shock might co-79
ordinate the expectations of weakness and consequent need for devaluation and thus
trigger a crisis (i.e. the countries were pushed from a ‘good’ equilibrium to a ‘bad’
one).
As noted, the trigger in this case was the sudden decline in exports in Thailand
in 1996 over the previous year, after growing at an annual average of about 19
percent between 1990 and 1995. This currency crisis interacted with the financial
fragilities in the country, which in turn made apparent and exacerbated frailties in the
real economy. While the contagion or negative spillover effects on the rest of the
region was inevitable (for reasons highlighted in section 5.2), policy slippages in
Indonesia (by the IMF regarding the decision on sudden bank closures and
subsequent policy reversals by the Suharto regime) and Malaysia (with government
statements in the midst of the crisis that only served to intensify market uncertainty),
significantly worsened the situation. The largely unanticipated deterioration in
economic conditions in the region following the devaluation of the Thai baht (at least
in terms of suddenness and magnitude), along with the ‘uncharacteristic’ indecision by
regional policy-makers, sharply undermined market confidence in the region. This led
to a vicious downward spiral, with the ‘overshooting’ in the financial markets further
worsening the panic
70. Consequent appreciation of the local value of external
liabilities, which were denominated in foreign currencies and largely unhedged,
coupled with the sudden curtailment of external credit, led to large-scale insolvencies.
This only added to the panic and accelerated capital outflows.
Admittedly, this conclusion is definitely bound to be much more controversial
for Thailand, given the existence of various economic weaknesses noted. One may
add though that the weaknesses in Thailand were largely similar to that of Mexico in
1994-95, and Sachs, et al.’s (1996b) conclusion of the Mexican case, was as noted,
                                               
70 Analytically, overshooting of asset prices was formalised by Dornbusch (1976). In this
classic paper, he showed how the monetary approach to exchange rates does allow for the
possibility of short-term overshooting of the exchange rate if there exist different adjustment
speeds between  the assets and goods markets. The issue however is one of an overshooting
of even this (Dornbusch) the overshooting equilibrium.80
one of sudden death. Indeed, while Thailand’s GDP growth in 1996 did slowdown, it
remained at a healthy 6.7 percent (down from 8.9 percent annual average the
previous five years). Further, as discussed in section 3, and as in the case of Mexico
(see Sachs, et al., 1996a), there existed little ‘evidence’ of an impending crisis in
terms of trends in Thailand’s risk premium, credit ratings, private sector/IMF growth
forecasts and the like. Rather, there seems to have been an abrupt reversal from
extreme bullishness regarding the growth prospects of the Thai economy to one of
excessive bearishness. What did exist however, were some anecdotal and ‘bits and
pieces’ of microeconomic evidence which alluded to the existence of some
weaknesses, particularly in relation to the financial sector (see footnote 71). Insofar as
this is the case, as noted in the introduction, two broad sets of important policy
implications warrant emphasising.
First, analytically, the multiple equilibra models emphasise the importance of
sound economic fundamentals as a necessary condition in preventing a crisis from
occurring. However these models - particularly once the contagion effects are
incorporated - highlight that ‘fairly good’ fundamentals per se are in and by
themselves insufficient to preclude a possible currency crises. Conversely, this makes
their predictions so much more challenging (impossible?). As aptly noted by
Dornbusch (1997, p.2), “(o)f six crises predicted by experts, five never happen.”
What we can say with certainty though, is that certain steps such as a
judicious debt management policy, which pays close attention to the level, maturity
and currency composition of external debt obligations, ought to significantly reduce
(though probably not eliminate) the chance of a crisis from occurring. Particular
attention must be paid to strengthening the financial and banking systems (including
prudential regulations). Indeed, Calvo and Mendoza (1996) have developed a model
under which abrupt and exogenous shifts in foreign capital flows and anticipation of
sovereign financial system bailouts, could generate a currency run, which gets
exacerbated due to self-fulfilling or herd behaviour. Such a model seems to capture
many of the stylised facts that have emerged from Thai crisis (and the Mexican crisis81
too)
71. According to Calvo and Mendoza (1996, pp.236-7), such crises are “a new kind
of balance-of-payments (BOP) crises in the era of global capital markets.” As such,
close attention needs to be paid to indications of financial vulnerability.
It is revealing that the most fundamentally sound economies in the larger East
Asian region, viz. Taiwan and Singapore, have been much less affected (relatively
speaking). Nevertheless, just as regional interdependence was promoted as crucial
during the boom periods in stimulating and sustaining growth in the region, no matter
how fundamentally strong an economy, it is almost inevitable that there will be some
fall-out from instability in neighbouring economies. Accordingly, the need for regional
cooperation on matters involving mutual surveillance of economic policies and the
development of early warnings system take on important dimensions, and have been
highlighted in this paper. Other policy issues on a global level that involve reforming
the international financial architecture, have also been discussed in some detail.
Second, and finally, with regard to economic data, there is a definite need for
policy-makers to work towards the timely and regular availability of aggregate, macro
data. Indeed, this has been high on the IMF’s agenda since the Mexican crisis (as
part of the so-called Special Data Dissemination Standard). More importantly though
is the need to make available and transparent more comprehensive and detailed data,
such as sectoral breakdown of aggregate savings, the manner in which public and
private (mandated) savings are channelled, the degree of exposure of banks and
other institutions to asset markets (mainly the property sector), the rate of return on
physical and financial assets invested domestically and overseas and the extent of
off-budget and contingent fiscal liabilities. The availability of such data, along with a
more ‘research-conducive’ environment may hopefully enhance the quality of
economic analysis and debate in the region. Such openness can only augur well for
                                               
71 In the sense that the Thai crisis did have precedence, it was “death foretold’. This only
emphasises the fact that the notion of ‘sustainable’ growth path in open global capital markets
remains far from clear-cut. The significant point though is that the issue of Thailand’s
vulnerability is far less clear-cut or certain, as one may be led to believe ex-post by most other
research and popular writings on the regional crisis.82
the economic future of the region at a time when globalised capital markets demand
the maintenance of constant vigilance on all economic parameters.83
Table A1
Macroeconomic Indicators of Southeast Asian Economies (SEAEs) and Latin
American Economies (LAEs)
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   n.a.
  20
  60
    4.2
  22.7
   -0.5
   -4.7
  19.2
  14.7
    4.5
    7.2
    4.9
  20.1
  40.4
    n.a.
  40
  80
    3.6
  15.5
    1.5
   -6.7
   20.5
   16.3
     4.1
   17.1
    8.2
  24.3
  34.6
    n.a.
  30
  80
    2.0
    9.8
    0.7
   -5.8
  20.0
  15.9
    4.1
  16.4
  12.3
     5.2
   36.9
 195.1
   40
   70
    4.5
    7.0
   -0.1
   -7.0
  20.3
   16.1
    4.2
    n.a.
   17.3
   21.4
   38.4
 178.9
   10
    20
    -6.2
   35.0
    -0.1
    -0.5
   17.2
   14.0
     3.2
     n.a.
   30.7
    -8.7
   69.9
 170.5
    30
    50
    5.2
  34.4
   -0.1
   -0.8
   17.4
   14.0
     3.4
     n.a.
   20.7
   23.5
   62.6
 155.5
   30
   50
    2.6
  21.6
   -0.2
   -4.0
  19.0
  15.0
    4.0
  12.3
    9.4





Notes:     a) Real GDP growth; b) Inflation rate;  c) Fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio; d) Current account 
    balance-to-GDP;  e) Investment-to-GDP ratio; f) Private Investment-to-GDP ratio; g) Public 
    Investment-to-GDP ratio; h) Savings-to-GDP ratio; i) Export  growth; j) Import growth;85
    k) External Debt-to-GDP ratio; l) External Debt-to-Export ratio (approximations)
    m) International Reserves-to-Import ratio (approximations); n) Forex  Reserves-to-Short-
    term Debt ratio; o) averages based on available annual data; p) General government 
    balance for SEAEs; overall public sector balance for  Argentina and Mexico; public sector 
    operational balance for Brazil
Sources:   Compiled by author from Edwards, et al. (1996), EIU, Country Reports, various issues, 
Hwang (1997), IMF, International  Financial Statistics, various years, Glen and Sumlinski
(1997), IMF (1998b), Kiguel (1998), Neuhas, et al. (1998), Nomura Research Institute                    
(1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998a), World Bank (1998)86
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Notes:   a) Figures for 1997 are estimates
Sources: Complied  by author from EIU , Country Reports, various issues, IMF,
  International Financial Statistics, various years, IMF (1998b),
  Radelet and Sachs (1998a) and World Bank (1998)87
 Appendix 1: The Korean Economy versus the SEAEs
The Korean chaebols are characterised by complex and opaque intra-group
cross-ownership and financing arrangements and practically dominate all aspects of
the Korean economy
72. In the absence of effective shareholder pressure to ensure
market-consistent rates of return on assets, coupled with the seeming obsession of
the chaebols with aggressively expanding to gain market share (The Economist,
October 18,  1997, pp.81-2), some of the conglomerates have been experiencing
mounting losses on sustained bases (table A3). The conglomerates have been kept
afloat by large-scale and indiscriminate state-directed bank lending on a non-
commercial bases (referred to as ‘ever-greening’), as credit was used as a key
instrument in industrial targeting policies. This led to gross over-investments in the
petrochemicals, semi-conductor and auto sectors (Hong, 1998 and Vittas and Cho,
1995).
Admittedly, on the one hand, the SEAEs also confronted (and continue to do
so) some similar concerns in terms of weak banking systems with substandard
disclosure procedures, structure of external indebtedness (loaded at the short end)
and weak conglomerates (primarily in Indonesia). On the other, the problems in Korea
were magnified and brought forward by the initial speculative attacks on some of the
currencies of the SEAEs. This was mainly due to the ‘contagion effect’ (elaborated
upon in section 5.2), as well as losses experienced by the Korean banks which had
lent to firms in the SEAEs.
However three important differences between Korea and the SEAEs bear
highlighting. First, the major chaebols were faced with bankruptcy prior to the sharp
nominal depreciation of the won. In contrast, the non-financial institutions in the
SEAEs (primarily involving Indonesia) were forced into bankruptcy because of sharp
currency depreciations and concomitant increases in unhedged foreign currency
denominated liabilities.
                                               
72 The top five chaebols were each reported to be in an average of 140 different businesses,
while the top four accounted for about half of Korea’s aggregate exports (The Economist,
November 29, 1997, pp.21-3).88
Second, the extent of exposure of Korean banks to the property sector was
generally lower than those of the SEAEs (Hwang, 1997 and JP Morgan, 1998, p.5).
Indeed, the initial weaknesses in the SEAEs only became clear as major financial
institutions in the region were propped up by their governments following downturns in
their respective real estate markets.
Third, while Korea, like the SEAEs faced sharp deceleration in export growth
in 1996-97, the relatively acute structural problem in Korea is emphasised by the fact
that its real effective exchange rate (REER) has actually declined since 1991, while
those in the SEAEs appreciated suddenly between 1995 and 1997 (chart 12). In other
words, Korea’s international cost competitiveness ought to have risen, while those of
the SEAEs declined (the caveat in footnote 11 notwithstanding).
By way of broad generalisations, as a matter of degree, the Korean debacle is
largely one of insolvency of the industrial structure
73. A solvency crisis is a problem of
‘lack of net worth’ and necessitates the wholesale restructuring of the
manufacturing/industrial structure (including allowing for liquidation and the fire-sale of
assets). It cannot be averted through the mere provision of credit at market terms, this
possibly only prolonging the inevitable and making it that much more painful when
finally undertaken.
To the extent that the 30 largest chaebols accounted for about one third of the
financial sector’s capital and about 35 percent of Korea’s total manufacturing sector,
the insolvent nature of the Korean economy is emphasised by the following couple of
facts which were in existence prior to the financial crisis (the crisis directly impacted
the Korean won only in late October and early November 1997). One, in 1996, the
rate of return on invested capital (ROIC) in 20 of the largest 30 chaebols was below
the cost of capital. Two, by mid 1997, 8 of the 30 major chaebols were placed under
bankruptcy protection. These included the Jinro and Kia groups, the latter being
                                               
73 As noted in footnote 3 and appendix 2, the condition for intertemporal solvency at
an aggregate level is so weak that it is almost never violated.89
Korea’s third largest conglomerate (International Currency Review, April, 1988,
pp.137-44 and Corsetti, et al., 1988)
74.
In contrast, as in the case of Mexico and Argentine during the Tequila crisis in
1994-95, the problems in SEAEs as group, at least began as a currency and financial
crisis, leading to illiquidity due to curtailment of external sources of credit following the
onset of the crisis. To be sure, a liquidity crisis is primarily one of loss of creditor
confidence and may be averted by the provision of credit at market terms. In other
words, it is a ‘cash flow’ or ‘financing’ problem.
The above solvency versus liquidity dichotomy, while conceptually useful -
with obvious policy implications regarding the efficacy and structure of ‘bail out’
packages - is admittedly far from airtight. For instance, a number of firms in Southeast
Asia presumably borrowed from abroad on the assumption that, if things continued as
they were, they would obtain adequate revenues to honour the debt. What they
ignored were potentially grave revenue-payment maturity mismatches, anticipating
continued/automatic rollover of the debts. With unforeseen and significant
depreciation of their currencies and consequent curtailment of credit, while a number
of firms became illiquid, others were pushed into states of insolvency, as the expected
net present values (ENPVs) of their projects turned negative. This occurred because,
in the absence of appropriate foreign exchange (forex) risk management (i.e. currency
hedging) strategies, the nominal exchange rate deprecations made the domestic
currency value of foreign currency-denominated liabilities (predominantly $-based)
much larger.
                                               
74 As concluded by one of the leading experts on Korea’s industrial structure, Hong (1998,
p.152):
one has to be well aware of the legacy of the long repressed financial regime.
Quite a few of Korea’s big business groups have been kept alive by
subsidised loans. Financial deregulation, even if it is followed by liberal access
to the international capital market, will result in bankruptcy of a large number
of uncompetitive firms including banks. Until now Korean Chaebols have been
able to borrow without much difficulty at the international markets with the
system of cross-guarantee as well as explicit or implicit government
repayment guarantees.90
The key point is that while sharing some similarities, the Korean debacle was
largely due to government-directed credit policies as part of misguided industrial
targeting policies towards supposed ‘strategic sectors’. The financial sector’s fragilities
in Korea in turn were due to the fact that the financial institutions in Korea were
effectively part of the conglomerate structure, and losses incurred by the industrial
sectors depleted the commercial banking system’s asset base (Corsetti, et al., 1998).
In other words, a financial cum currency crisis was probably not the primary cause of
Korea’s problems, as it was in the case of the SEAEs.91
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Source: Corsetti, et al. (1998)92
 Appendix 2: A Measure of External Creditworthiness
75
For reasons discussed in the main text, the level of the current account deficit
per se is of limited use (see section 5.2), not least because it is a measure of current
levels of indebtedness, with no regard for expected future trends. At the other
extreme, are the concepts of intertemporal solvency, previously noted. Though a
useful theoretical construct, it is not very helpful as an indicator of external
creditworthiness. The solvency notion is far too ‘loose’ to be of much
practical/operational relevance, as all it requires is for existing debt stocks to be
balanced by trade surpluses in present value terms in the future. This implies that a
country could conceptually run protracted external deficits so long as it is matched by
equivalent trade surpluses (in present value terms) sometime in the future. In other
words, there needs to be a ‘turning point’ from persistent trade deficits to surpluses at
some point in time. Indeed, if the interest rate on debt exceeds the GDP growth rate,
solvency could be consistent with an ever-increasing debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e. a so-
called ‘Ponzi game’ - which entails borrowing to repay interest on outstanding debt -
could be played indefinitely).
In light of this, a stronger version of solvency requires that, in ‘steady state’,
the debt-to-GDP ratio is constant (as are the other macro variables such as capital-
output ratio). This transversality condition requires that, in the presence of a trade
deficit, the interest rate cannot exceed GDP growth. However even this condition is of
little operational value (steady state?) and provides little information on the
‘sustainable’ or ‘optimal’ level of the current account deficit (as perceived by
creditors), this depending on the specific value of the debt-to GDP ratio (see footnote
75).
In addition, the solvency criterion assumes away the possibility of ‘liquidity
constraints’. Specifically, the notion relies on the assumption that creditors will be
willing to roll over debts at current levels, without regard to possible adverse
expectations-alterations which may lead to a liquidity crunch (also see Calvo, 1996,
                                               
75 This section is highly tentative and subject to revision.93
Milesi-Feretti and Razin, 1996 and Reisen, 1996, 1998).  At a time when most
external financing involves private capital flows at commercial rates with maturities
that may be broadly termed short to medium-term, these assumptions are clearly
untenable. Accordingly, as noted by Ostry (1997), it is the notion of sustainability -
which takes into account shifts in private sector expectations - as opposed to weak
solvency criteria that is of practical relevance. The question remains as to how to
operationalise the concept of current account deficit sustainability.
Dadush, Dhareshwar and Johannes (1994) - DDJ henceforth - have proposed
a measure of current account deficit sustainability, called the asymptotic liabilities-
export ratio (ALER), that does account for such alterations in creditor-expectations.
Below we derive and slightly generalise the result by DDJ. The ALER is defined as
the rate at which foreign liabilities-to-exports ratio converges on the basis of expected
trends in exports. Let D denote the foreign liabilities and X denote exports. As with
DDJ, assume a target debt-to-export ratio of 2 (the more conservative rule of thumb
noted in section 2.4, and close to the World Bank debt-to-export benchmark ratio of
2.2)
76
D/X       =  2
Assuming as a first approximation that the net accumulation of international
reserves is zero, the current account deficit (CAD) is equal to the net change in










=   2
  CAD
e
/Y =  (M - X + rD)
e
/Y   =  2(∆ X
e
/X)/(X/Y) -----  (1)
                                               
76 Choice of this number is not critical, as the aim is to determine deteriorating trends/outliers.94
where, X - exports, M - imports; ∆ X
e
 = expected change in exports; r = foreign real
interest rates; Y = national output
77.
Equation (1) suggests that as far as creditworthiness is concerned, it is not the
level of the current account deficit per se that is of significance. Rather, the greater
the confidence in the borrowers’ ability to repay the debt, the larger the ‘permissible’
current account deficit (as seen by creditors and other private agents). The ability to
repay external debt is broadly proxied by current export-to-GDP ratio and expected
future export growth. The latter is self-explanatory, measuring trends in exports. The
former is important, as a country with a large export-to-GDP share can more easily
service existing debts, as debt service obligations absorb a smaller proportion of total
export revenues (Milesi-Feretti and Razin, 1996 and Ostry, 1997).
Thus, in the presence of large-scale dependence on external debt - especially
that which is short-term in nature - the focus that countries place on stimulating
exports is understandable and rational. Further, the shorter the debt maturity, the
more important short-term expected export growth prospects become. Hence, even if
an economy projects a robust growth in exports over the longer time horizon (i.e.
sound fundamentals), any cyclical down-turn or shock which affects expected growth
in exports in the short-term may make the current account deficit - even if it doesn’t
change by much, or actually decreases - seem unsustainable and concomitantly, the
country perceived as being less creditworthy
78.
                                               
77 Formally, note that in steady state, ∆ D = gD where g = GDP growth rate. Thus
CAD/Y = (M - X + rD)/Y. We then obtain that: (M – X)/Y = (g - r)(D/Y), which is the
previously noted transversality condition, viz. a trade deficit may be financed as long
as the real GDP growth rate exceeds the real interest rate. In the transition or non-
steady state path, we obtain the solvency condition:
Do  =   ∑∑∑∑  [(M – X)t e(g - r) t] where Do is the current debt stock.
                 t = 0 to ∞∞∞∞
78 Empirical application is the focus of ongoing research.95
      Appendix 3: Mechanics of Attack on a Currency –
A Simple Illustration
While the broad empirical regularities of a currency crisis at a macro-level
have been discussed elsewhere (see Calvo, et al., 1996, Rajan, 1998b and Schadler,
et al., 1994 for instance), it would be useful to consider the ‘micro-mechanics’ of the
process.
Consider the case of an attack on the Thai baht. For simplicity, we assume
there to be four players, a single (foreign) private agent (speculator/hedger), one
foreign bank (FB) (or financial intermediary/market-maker), a domestic (Thai) bank
(DB) and the Thai monetary authority, Bank of Thailand (BT). We assume two
currencies, viz. the Thai baht (weak) and the $ (strong).
Stage 1: The attack on the currency occurs when the private agent acquires a
contract to sell the baht forward in return for $ from the FB (i.e. sell it today for future
delivery) in anticipation of future baht devaluation. Alternately, they could borrow the
baht immediately and sell it on the spot market The former is what ‘classic
speculators’ such as hedge funds usually do. Outright forwards are conceptually
similar to spot transactions, except that they are actually undertaken sometime in the
future (specifically, more than two business days after the conclusion of the deal).
More risk-averse speculators, or those wanting to hedge operations - such as
mutual/pension funds or multinationals - will usually buy a put option on the Thai baht,
willing to pay a premium for the relative safety of these instruments (in terms of down-
side risk)
79. A purchaser of a put has the right but not obligation to sell the currency at
a pre-determined strike price. The basic point is that if there is a belief of an
impending devaluation, the agents will want to acquire a short position in the currency
and cancel or unwind this position by purchasing the currency post-devaluation.
                                               
79 The IMF (1997c, p.11) estimates the total asset holdings of hedge funds, propriety traders
and speculative mutual funds to be at more than $100bn, with these funds having leveraged
their position 5-10 times. Note that the term ‘hedge fund’ is a gross misnomer, as these funds
invest portfolios of a small group of large investors with the primary aim of speculating (i.e.
taking open positions) on weak currencies.96
Stage 2: The primary business of commercial banks is to trade or act as middlemen
(i.e. market-makers), and they will most often be averse to taking open positions in
the forex market
80. Accordingly, since the FB now has a liability of $ and an asset in
the form of the Thai baht to be purchased forward, it needs to counter or close this
position. Thus, it will sell the Thai baht spot for $ to the DB. At the same time, since
there is a mismatch between assets and liabilities (the original transaction with the
speculator/hedger being on a forward basis, while this one is done spot), it is covered
through a currency swap with some other bank. The counter-party for both
transactions in our stylised case is the DB. More generally though, the spot and swap
transactions need not be (and usually are not), undertaken with the same party. The
important point is that eventually the transaction must involve the DB.
Stage 3: The DB buys the Thai baht for $ spot and engages in a swap that is the
mirror-image of the transaction by the FB. The DB, as in the case of the FB, will want
to ensure no substantive open position (in terms of currency or maturity). Hence, to
cover its position, the DB will sell the baht spot to the BT and will simultaneously
borrow baht forward from the BT, which it has to deliver in the future. By providing
liquidity to the market, the central bank in essence finances the attack on it’s own
currency. Of course, failure to supply this liquidity will lead to a de facto depreciation
of the currency. This is the bare-bones version of a speculative attack.
Defence Mechanisms:  If the BT was the counter-party in the initial forward
transaction with the private agent shorting the baht (i.e. if it intervened directly  to
purchase the baht forward), it automatically supplies credit to the market If the forward
long positions by the DB equals the short ones by the speculators, all positions cancel
out each other with no impact on the spot rate. However, such forward intervention is
                                               
80 However this fine distinction between market-makers, hedgers and speculators gets very
fudgy during crisis periods. For instance, Krause (1991, pp.67 and 107) have noted that a
number of banks frequently take very large speculative positions either on their own accounts
or on behalf of their customers. Felix and Sau (1996, p.227) have noted that multinationals
were heavily involved in taking open positions in the run-up to the ERM crisis.97
limited by the available credit lines to the BT (i.e. its own reserve holdings as well as
in cooperation with other central banks mainly in the region), especially so as it
creates a net negative forex position (with the risk of large capital losses). While this is
usually the first line of defence, if this intervention fails to thwart the run on the
currency, the BT has a few things left that it could do. Recall that the counter-party to
the forward transaction (i.e. the DB), needs to borrow baht to meet its forward contractual
obligation, while selling baht spot to the BT. The BT could refuse to provide liquidity to the
system, the ensuing credit crunch leading to a rise in interest rates. This is the classic interest
rate defence. If the rate is kept high for a period of time, agents who have short sold the baht
will now need to sell foreign currency ($) in order to meet their obligations, hence relieving
some of the pressure on the baht. Conceptually, while a marked rise interest rates could stave
of an attack, it may not always be successful or remain in place long enough to be so. This is
so for a number of reasons. 
First, as noted, a rise in interest rates will negatively impact the real
economy (such as investment, growth, employment, and size of the public debt). Thus
the BT will eventually have to abandon this policy, with foreign traders waiting to
pounce. 
Second, there will be sharp adverse repercussions on the domestic financial
system, as banks had lent at fairly low interest rates when the system was flush with
liquidity, but they now have to pay depositors this much higher interest rate
81. They
will thus apply intense pressure on the BT to provide the necessary credit to the
banking system.
Third, high interest rates may have all sorts of internal income redistributional
effects, for instance, by impacting mortgage rates.
                                               
81 This is a particularly significant point, as weaknesses in the domestic banking system can
seriously paralyse a government from taking appropriate stances to counter a currency run.
Specifically, while a speculative attack requires a (sharp) hike in interest rates, if the banking
system is plagued by bad debts, such a policy could, by contracting economic activity and
deflating asset prices, substantially exacerbate the situation. Hence a currency crisis could be
turned into a financial crisis, with far more adverse repercussions on the domestic real
economy. This is especially problematic in developing economies, and was faced by Mexico
during the Tequila crisis, as well as by the crisis in East Asia.98
Fourth, the rise in interest rates may be seen as a signal by ‘mechanistic’
traders using dynamic option hedging techniques (who follow models such as the
uncovered interest parity theorem) of an impending depreciation of the baht (Garber,
1995). Therefore, along with the initial speculators, these mechanistic traders also join
the fray. If these selling volumes exceed the buying ones (of those caught short in the
baht when rates were hiked), this would result in magnified pressure on the currency.
Eventually, the BT may have to acquiesce to this pressure, leading to a nominal
devaluation of the currency
82.
The BT may attempt to further defend the currency (if not it’s level, at least the
rate of depreciation) by buying it spot. However this will lead to a drain in reserves,
and as noted in the previous section, the official reserves are in general grossly
inadequate to counter a sustained currency run. Temporary restrictions on capital flows may
also be implemented, though this could fuel expectations of the unsustainability of the
country’s policies, hence giving rise to even more pressure. Other temporary measures involve
attempting to distinguish speculators from non-speculators (i.e. users of forex for ‘real
transactions’) and impose restrictions/interest costs on the former (i.e. ‘splitting the
market’).
In summary, following the immediate aftermath of a (successful)
currency attack, the economy in question is almost always characterised by:
a) a drain on the government’s official reserves;
b) an increase in short-term external indebtedness;
c) a sharp hike in interest rates;
d) an imposition of temporary restrictions on bank lending and capital
outflows (on a general or discriminatory basis);
e) an eventual abandonment of the exchange rate peg and (series of)
discrete nominal devaluation(s);
                                               
82 The costs of hiking interest rates is an important point, because technically speaking,
governments could defend a currency peg (by curtailing the monetary base sufficiently) if it
were willing to subordinate all other goals (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, pp.77-80).99
f) a deteriorating trade balance due to the J-curve effect (unless this is
offset by import restraints, which exacerbates and in turn is
exacerbated by domestic recessionary conditions); and
g) stagflation due to a potent combination of the inflationary effects of the
devaluation, as well as the recessionary conditions due to:
i. a temporary hike in interest rates;
ii. forex controls that inhibit imports of intermediate goods; and
iii. deleterious effects of uncertainty on physical investment.100
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